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Moral knowledge, to the extent anyone has it, is as much a matter of knowing 
how—how to act, react, feel and reflect appropriately—as it is a matter of 
knowing that—that injustice is wrong, courage is valuable, and care is due. 
Such knowledge is embodied in a range of capacities, abilities, and skills that 
are not acquired simply by learning that certain things are morally required 
or forbidden or that certain abilities and skills are important.' To lose sight 
of this fact, to focus exclusively on questions concerning what is commonly 
called propositional knowledge, is to lose one's grip on (at least one crucial 
aspect of) the intimate connection between morality and action. At the same 
time, insofar as it suggests that moral capacities can be exhaustively accounted 
for by appeal to peoples' cognitive states, to focus on propositional knowledge 
is to invite an overintellectualized picture of those capacities. No account of 
moral knowledge will be adequate unless it does justice to the ways in which 
knowing right from wrong, and good from bad, is not , simply a matter of 
forming the correct beliefs but is a matter of acquiring certain abilities to act, 
react, feel, and reflect appropriately in the situations in which one finds oneself. 
And this means a satisfying treatment of moral epistemology must give due 
attention to what's involved in knowing how to be moral. 
I mention this now, at the beginning of my paper, as a partial corrective 
to what follows. For in the rest of this paper I will not be giving due attention 
to what's involved in knowing how to be moral. I won't even give much 
attention to what's involved in knowing that something is moral (or not). I 
will be concentrating instead almost exclusively on questions concerning the 
justification of moral belief, and will then be focusing—even more nar-
rowly—on questions of epistemic, rather than moral, justification, giving only 
indirect attention to issues relating to moral justification? I will be asking: 
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Under what conditions are a person's moral beliefs epistemically justified? 
And so: Under what conditions are our moral beliefs epistemically justified? 
What I hope to offer here is an account of epistemic justification that can 
do justice to the epistemic challenges our moral beliefs face, while leaving 
MOM for some of those beliefs, sometimes, to count as justified in precisely 
the same way our more mundane nonmoral beliefs, sometimes, do. I don't 
mean to suggest, and I certainly won't argue, that our moral beliefs are actually 
as justified as many of our other beliefs are. I think many of them are not; 
the challenges they face properly induce epistemic humility. But I do think 
that some of our moral beliefs are justified and justified in the same sense (if 
not always to the same degree) as are many of our other beliefs. 
As a result, what be doing is primarily defending in general—and 
without special regard for morality—a theory of the epistemic justification of 
belief that applies across the board to all our beliefs. Despite my being espe-
cially concerned with the status of our moral beliefs, then, a great deal of the 
discussion that follows will be put in terms that self-consciously and intention-
ally don't speak directly to morality. So far as I can see, the epistemic evaluation 
of our moral beliefs is of a piece with that of all our other beliefs; there is no 
distinctive epistemology of moral belief. 
Nonetheless, our moral beliefs do have distinctive features that render 
them epistemologically suspect. Most notably, our moral beliefs are disturb-
ingly hard to justify in the face of disagreement. All too often we are reduced 
to invoking convictions that seem more obviously right than any justification 
we might offer for them, even as we recognize that others find incompatible 
views (that they are no better able to defend) equally obvious. Even if we 
are confident that we can explain away what we take to be their mistaken views 
by appeal to their particular situation, experience, and especially training, it 
takes no leap of the imagination to see that similar explanations of our views 
are available to them. Worse, those explanations are available to us; when 
we turn our attention to the explanation of our own views, just the same sorts 
of explanations seem to go through—explanations that appeal to physical, 
psychological, and social facts, but not to moral facts, as the determinants of 
our beliefs. We seem ourselves to be able to explain all our own moral views 
without having to suppose that any of them are actually true. 
The difficulties merely compound when we wonder what it would take for 
those beliefs actually to be true, even given our inclination to think some of 
them are. On reflection, it is not at all clear, for instance, how moral properties 
(assuming there are some) might fit into and relate to the world as we know 
it. Unlike everyday nonmoral properties of normal-sized objects, moral prop-
erties seem to make a claim on us regardless of our tastes, preferences, and 
affective attitudes. They seem to have a distinctive normative authority that 
allows them legitimately to command the allegiance of everyone. That some 
course of action is right, that some thing is good, that some character admirable, 
apparently necessarily gives us reason to act or respond in some way or 
another, whereas that some act is legal, or some thing blue, or some character 
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uncommon, seem in themselves to provide no particular reason to act or 
respond at all. Yet it is a mystery how moral properties might come by this 
authority. Moreover, as different from others as these putatively authoritative 
facts seem to be, they do not float free of the more mundane physical, psycho-
logical, and social properties of people, actions, or institutions. In fact, people, 
actions, and institutions apparently have the moral properties they do always 
thanks to their nonmoral properties, even as their being right or wrong, 
virtuous or vicious, just or unjust, looks to be something over and above their 
exhibiting whatever nonmoral properties they do. 
At the same time, for us to be able to discover moral properties (if we 
ever do), it looks as if we would have to rely on some means other than those 
we normally use to learn about the world. We don't seem to see, taste, hear, 
smell, or touch moral properties, nor do we seem to rely on common methods 
of empirical investigation and confirmation to discover them. Although we 
speak of feeling that something is wrong, or right, the suggestion that these 
feelings are extra or suprasensory perceptions, the product of some special 
moral faculty, is hardly plausible. Despite the apparent dependence of moral 
properties on nonmoral properties, the results of empirical investigation ap-
pears to be altogether irrelevant to the justification of our moral views (al-
though not to their application). Our moral beliefs have, at best, it seems, 
only a tenuous connection to experience, a connection evidently established 
more by the moral convictions we bring to bear on that experience than by 
the untainted input of experience. 
All told, then, what these moral properties might actually be and how 
we might manage to learn about them is, at least, mysterious. Their very 
mysteriousness naturally raises doubts about what grounds we might actually 
have for our moral beliefs. 
These concerns are not at all easily or confidently put to rest. They work 
together not simply to undermine confidence in our particular convictions, 
but also to suggest that our moral views as a whole might best be seen as an 
explicable illusion.' Some would even say that these problems offer good 
grounds for embracing noncognitivism—for thinking our moral attitudes are 
best viewed not as beliefs at all but rather as expressions of preference, or a 
projection of our sentiments, or a reflection of norms we (just happen to) 
embrace. When it comes to our moral attitudes, they say, epistemic evaluations 
are out of place because the attitudes in question are not the sorts of things 
that can be true or false.' 
I am not myself inclined to noncognitivism. And, in another context, I 
would argue that when the reasons adduced to justify some action or attitude 
succeed, they simultaneously provide grounds for one's thinking, of certain 
moral judgments concerning the actions or attitudes, that they are true.' But 
that argument is not so important here, since the main questions I need to 
address—concerning the justification of belief (whether moral or not)—can 
and should be raised about the epistemic credentials of the noncognitivism I 
am inclined to reject.6 
 Consequently, in the rest of the paper, I will simply 
assume (contentiously) that people do sometimes have moral beliefs and that 
we can reasonably wonder about them whether they are epistemically justified 
in believing as they do. 
In what follows, I will defend a coherence theory of epistemic justification 
according to which our beliefs, moral and otherwise, are justified only if, and 
then to the extent that, they cohere well with the other things we believe. On 
this view, whether a person's beliefs are justified is a matter of how well they 
hang together. One person, then, may be justified in holding some belief that 
another would be justified in rejecting, and how justified the first person would 
be is not a matter of her belief actually being true, nor a matter of it satisfying 
some epistemic standard wholly independent of the other things she believes, 
but rather a function precisely of what else she believes. 
In the end, and perhaps not surprisingly, what recommends this view is 
that it coheres well—better than its competitors—with what we already believe 
concerning justification. Most especially, I will be trying to accommodate two 
features of justification. The first is that a person may be justified in holding 
a view we recognize .to be false, and massively so. This is the force and 
implication of dramatic examples well known in epistemology that appeal to 
evil demons and brains in vats. But the same recognition crops up in everyday 
situations in which we recognize someone as justifiably holding the views they 
do despite their being unfortunately ill-informed or understandably misled 
by the partial information they have available. The second feature is that 
holding justified beliefs represents an accomplishment that is bound up with 
actually having some reason to think what one believes is true. So although 
one might justifiably believe what (as it happens) is false, one must, even in 
those situations, have reason to think it true. 
Of course, the fit between the coherence theory and our initial convictions 
concerning justification will at points be less than perfect, and later in the 
paper I will be at pains to explain away, rather than accommodate, some of 
the views that make other accounts of justification seem attractive. Nonethe-
less, the coherence theory does an extremely good job of explaining, and in 
other ways making sense of, the variety of views people have concerning the 
nature of epistemic justification. At the same time, I'll suggest, it has the 
significant advantage of making good sense of our actually being, at least to 
some extent and concerning some things, epistemically justified in holding 
our moral beliefs. 
Before spelling out the coherence theory of epistemic justification and 
defending it, I want first to back into the discussion by describing (what might 
be called) the coherence method for moral theorizing. This foray into method 
is appropriate for two reasons. First, I will, in effect, be applying the method 
to questions of epistemology, relying on the approach the method recommends 
in an attempt to identify and defend an acceptable theory of epistemic justifi-
cation. Second, the coherence theory's recent appeal, especially in moral 
theory, can be traced directly to the attractiveness of this method. In fact, 
many have thought that the coherence method is the only approach to moral 
theorizing that promises any hope of progress, and more than a few have seen  
the method as being intimately intertwined with the coherence theory. I should 
emphasize right off, though, what will become clear: that someone might value 
the method without thinking that the justification of our resulting views is a 
matter of their relative coherence. Although anyone attracted by the cohe-
rence theory will be inclined to endorse the methodology, adoption of the 
method is compatible with rejection of the coherence theory of justification.' 
Coherence and the Method of Reflective Equilibrium 
The coherence method, or at least evidence of its use, shows up throughout the 
history of moral theorizing. Yet the coherence method has risen to recognized 
prominence in moral theory only recently thanks to John Rawls' A Theory 
of Justice Referring to it there as the method of reflective equilibrium, Rawls 
characterizes the process of developing an acceptable moral theory as a matter 
of shifting back and forth among the various moral judgments one is initially 
inclined to make and the more or less abstract theoretical principles one is 
examining and attempting to develop, altering the collection of principles to 
fit better the judgments and adjusting the judgments so as to bring them, as 
best one can, in line with plausible principles. 
The method is anything but static; it is meant to be deployed continually 
as one's set of convictions shifts thanks to expanding experience and in light 
of reflecting on the grounds one might have for those convictions. All along, 
as the method would have it, one should increase the coherence of one's 
beliefs by eliminating inconsistencies, articulating principles that are already 
implicit in one's judgments, and seeking out further grounds that would justify 
and unify these judgments and principles, always being willing to shift one's 
view in light of the developments. As things progress, some of the initial 
judgments will have to be put aside as ill-informed, misguided, or otherwise 
suspect (perhaps because there seems to be no plausible way to defend them), 
and new commitments will come on board thanks sometimes just to expanding 
experience, and other times to seeing what is implicit in, or required by, what 
else one believes. 
The underlying idea is that, while we inevitably start with whatever atti-
tudes, convictions, and beliefs we have, and properly rely on them in adjusting 
our opinions, we should not rest content with things as they stand, but should 
instead subject our evaluative attitudes to the pressures of reflection—doing 
what we can to render systematic, by providing general principles for, the 
hodgepodge of convictions with which we begin. Starting with our initial 
convictions we are to forge, as best we can, a consistent, unified, set of beliefs 
that inter-relate in ways that allow our more particular convictions to find 
support from more general principles, which themselves find support from 
their ability to account for the more particular judgments. 
The process is at least analogous to the one we rely on in developing our 
scientific theories, where we start with various observations, hypotheses, and 
hunches and then work to bring these together within a coherent system. All 
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the while, we are adjusting the theoretical principles so as to fit the relevant 
observations, articulate the general hypotheses, and follow our hunches, even 
as we are refining our observations, altering our hypotheses, and reevaluating 
our hunches, to bring them in line with our best theories. 
There are dangers, of course, in over-extending the analogy between scien-
tific and moral methodology, dangers that come, for instance, from thinking 
that the initial moral judgments must, like some perceptual observations, be 
due to the operation of a special faculty, or from thinking that moral principles 
must, like scientific laws, explain our making the judgments we do, or from 
thinking that moral theories, like scientific theories, tell us how things are 
but not how they should be. In many striking ways scientific inquiry differs 
substantially from moral inquiry. 
Yet there are dangers as well in ignoring the methodological analogy, 
dangers that come, most especially, from ignoring the extent to which moral 
judgments are , sensitive to reflection and argument, and from thinking that 
experience has no role to play in expanding and confirming our moral views. 
Regardless, so far as the method is concerned, our aim should be to bring 
our various views, no matter what they concern (physics, ethics, epistemology, 
or mathematics), into a reflective equilibrium. 
Two sorts of equilibria might be sought in moral theorizing: a narrow 
equilibrium that is reached if one settles on a set of moral principles that 
cohere well with the moral judgments that, on reflection, one is willing to 
embrace; and a wider equilibrium that requires more, as it brings into the mix 
not just particular moral judgments and general moral principles but also 
judgments and principles concerning whatever psychological, social, physical, 
or metaphysical matters might prove relevant—including judgments and prin-
ciples about the relevance of these other areas. Either would count as a reflec-
tive equilibrium as long as the various elements have been, and can continue 
to be, embraced in light of the pressures of reflection; yet their scope will 
vary according to what sorts of considerations are brought to bear. The actual 
equilibria that we establish, such as they are, are I suspect always, at best, 
only more or less wide. So while the method itself may forever encourage 
attempts to broaden the scope and deepen the understanding provided by 
one's theories, actually achieving a comprehensive reflective equilibrium will 
almost surely remain always at most an ideal.' 
Recommending the method right off is the fact that it seems, in some 
sense, simply to work. By trying to articulate principles that would underwrite, 
elaborate, or refine .the various judgments we're already inclined to make we 
often uncover (what we take to be) reasons for thinking the initial judgments 
were insufficiently subtle, or excessively parochial, or distressingly unsupport-
able. And we often find as well that various judgments we remain confident 
of, and can now support by appeal to more general principles, have implica-
tions we hadn't recognized and wouldn't have taken account of but for the 
attempt to understand what reason we might have for accepting them. Engag-
ing in the attempt to establish a reflective equilibrium often leads us not just 
to change our initial judgments but to change them, as we think, for the better. 
Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory 
	 143 
The question naturally arises: In what sense are our judgments better? 
One answer is that they are not better, at least not in any important sense. 
After all, the thought might go, any method that simply starts with the beliefs 
one happens to have and then works to generate a set of principles consistent, 
so far as possible, with those beliefs, is at best a recipe for a set of coherent 
principles that have no claim to our interest. Admittedly, if we had some 
independent reason for thinking our initial views accurately reflected the 
nature of morality, or that the coherence of a set of beliefs was reason to 
think them true, then we might have some reason to use the method. But we 
have no reason to think these things.1° 
Against this answer, I will eventually defend the method and its results 
on epistemic grounds, arguing that as one approaches a (wide) reflective 
equilibrium one thereby increases the extent to which the beliefs one holds 
are epistemically justified. On this view, what recommends the method is that 
using it is one and the same with trying to proportion one's beliefs to the 
available evidence. And this means that the method, successfully used, results 
in beliefs that are better because better justified. Since actually achieving wide 
reflective equilibrium is a matter of embracing a fully coherent—and so, in 
light of the coherence theory, well justified—set of beliefs, the method has 
conspicuous attractions for anyone who thinks, as I do, that the coherence 
theory of justification can be defended. Furthermore, I will argue, the attrac-
tions remain even though what reason we have for thinking our initial moral 
views accurate is not independent of the moral views they end up supporting 
in reflective equilibrium and even though we should not think that the mere 
coherence of our views gives us reason to think that they are true. 
While adopting the method makes obvious sense for anyone who accepts 
a coherence theory of epistemic justification, many have found the method 
attractive on other grounds. Some have recommended the coherence method 
as a useful way of discovering justified beliefs, despite their holding that the 
justification of those beliefs turns on something other than their cohering well 
with the variety of considerations the method brings to bear." This heuristic 
account of the value of the method of reflective equilibrium retains the view 
that the method's use results in a collection of beliefs that might be epistemi-
cally justified. What it rejects is the coherence theory's account of their justifi-
cation as being mutually dependent and turning on their relative coherence. 
Others who have found the method attractive trace its appeal not to the 
epistemic value of the resulting beliefs but to the moral importance of acting 
on principles one can, on reflection, consistently embrace. The underlying 
idea here is that one counts as having acted on principle at all only if the 
principle in question is such that one is willing to endorse its implications for 
cases other than those at hand. And one does that only when, in effect, the 
principle stands in reflective equilibrium both with one's other principles and 
with one's other judgments about particular cases, actual and possible, beyond 
those one happens to face. To claim to be acting on some principle, only to 
disown its implications for other cases, is to belie one's allegiance to the 
principle and to forfeit the backing it would otherwise offer for one's action. 
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While views of this sort offer a reason to value the coherence method, the 
reason offered is squarely moral; and while we might be tempted to ask why 
we should believe true the claim that we have such a reason, the claim itself 
is not an epistemic one. If people do have a moral reason to act only on a 
set of principles that stand in reflective equilibrium, then using the method, 
and restricting one's actions to those endorsed by the resulting set of convic-
tions, would make good sense even as it leaves aside completely questions of 
whether the beliefs are epistemically justified. 
Yet another way to defend the method, again without appealing to its 
epistemic value, is to argue that its use has significant practical advantages. 
Just as all sorts of advantages are secured by requiring that judges make 
explicit the rationale behind their decisions, so too, we might think, practical 
considerations require something similar of ordinary people. After all, moral 
thought and reflection obviously play a crucially important role in social life; 
to the extent this role might .best be served by people being able to articulate 
and defend the principles on which they act, using and recommending the 
method of reflective equilibrium would seem eminently reasonably. Not least 
of the advantages is that successful deployment of the method puts one in a 
good position to offer (either to oneself or to others) a coherent set of princi-
ples that might be open to scrutiny and evaluation. Widespread use of the 
method of reflective equilibrium, individually, or perhaps collectively, might 
even give us hope of our developing a coherent public morality—the advan-
tages of which may have nothing to do with truth. 
The practical value of the method is reflected in the fact that most effective 
forms of moral argumentation appear to work by revealing to people that 
their own views need shoring up or changing if those views are to cohere with 
others they are unwilling to jettison. Threats and promises might get people 
to change what they say, but when it comes to getting people actually to 
change their minds little works so well as showing them that, on balance, the 
views they already accept recommend the position one is defending. Of course, 
we should not exaggerate the effectiveness of this approach or its relative 
importance as a way of getting people to change their views. Clearly, its 
effectiveness is significantly constrained by peoples' willingness either to refuse 
to see the consequences of what they accept or, when they do, to accept those 
consequences no matter how implausible they are. And its relative importance 
needs to be measured with a steady eye on the frequency with which people 
change their views as a result of experience and exposure, imagination and 
empathy, rather than reflection and argumentation. Nevertheless, when we 
do work to change someone's view or to see whether our own might be 
improved, the considerations we bring to bear regularly play precisely the 
role the coherence method would recommend. 
Just how good these moral and practical defences of the method are, I'm 
not sure. I doubt that we have anything like a moral responsibility always to 
act on principle, let alone on a set of fully articulated principles of the sort 
the method would encourage us to seek. Too often, and in too many contexts, 
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it looks as if people are morally justified in acting as they do despite their 
inability to identify anything remotely like a clear set of principles. Responsible 
moral behavior doesn't seem to require reflective access to such principles. I 
doubt too that our various practical and social aims are well advanced by the 
more rarified and arcane results a full deployment of the method is likely to 
produce. Almost surely a point of diminishing practical returns will be reached 
well before the method's requirements have been satisfied. 
Even if these doubts are borne out, however, I think they wouldn't fully 
undermine an appeal to moral and practical considerations as relevant to a 
defence of the method. Actually, because I believe the method results in 
epistemically justified beliefs, and believe as well that we have a moral obliga-
tion of sorts to see that the moral convictions we act on are epistemically 
justified, I am committed to our having moral, and not just epistemic, reasons 
for using the method of reflective equilibrium. Still, I believe that the value 
of the method is not exhausted when a person satisfies this moral responsibility, 
such as it is. For part of what is valuable about the method is simply that it 
helps us to secure epistemically justified moral beliefs. 
In fact, one of the key advantages of the coherence theory of justification 
is that it can explain well what reason we have to use the method even after 
our moral responsibilities have been satisfied and our practical aims met. At 
least so I think. This suggestion will be plausible, however, only if good sense 
can be made out of the coherence theory of justification, and it is to that task 
that I now turn. So the rest of this paper can reasonably be seen as an extended 
defense of the peculiarly epistemic value of the coherence method. 
Epistemic Justification 
What does it take for a person to be justified in holding some beliefr'Different, 
and often incompatible; answers will be plausible depending on the sort of 
justification that is at issue. I'll mention three obvious possibilities. 
First, we might be concerned with whether a person is morally justified in 
holding the belief, in whether her holding of the belief satisfies the relevant 
moral standards. If so, we'll be interested, say, in whether she is within her 
rights to believe it, or in whether her believing it is (or is expected to be) 
conducive to the greatest happiness, or in whether her believing it is compatible 
with her other obligations. Which, if any, of these considerations should be 
invoked depends on what the right standards of moral justification actually 
are. (I've here only mentioned some leading candidates.) 
Second, we might be concerned with whether a person is in some other 
way pragmatically justified in holding the belief, in whether her holding of the 
belief satisfies the relevant pragmatic standards. If so, we'll be interested, say, 
in whether her believing it advances her interests, or in whether her believing 
it ,  is (subjectively or objectively) likely to contribute to the satisfaction of her 
preferences, or in whether her believing it will lead to a fulfilling life. Which, 
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if any, of these considerations should be invoked depends on what the right 
standards of pragmatic justification actually are. (Here too I've only mentioned 
some leading candidates.) 
Or third, we might be concerned with whether a person is epistemically 
justified in holding the belief, in whether her holding of the belief satisfies the 
relevant epistemic standards. If so, we'll be interested, say, in whether her 
believing it is appropriately sensitive to her evidence, or in whether her be-
lieving it means it is (subjectively or objectively) likely to be true, or in whether 
her believing it is the result of a reliable belief-forming process.” This time, 
which, if any, of these considerations should be invoked will depend on what 
the right standards of epistemic justification actually are. (And, again, I've 
only mentioned some leading candidates.) 
With these three sorts of justification in mind, we need to distinguish 
between justifying what is believed—the content of the belief—and justifying 
the state or act of believing. As I've described moral, pragmatic, and epistemic 
justification, the concern was with the latter, with whether a person was 
justified in holding a particular belief, not with whether the belief was justified. 
Sometimes, though, when we describe someone's moral belief as morally 
justified, we are interested in what she believes—in the content of her belief. 
And what we have in mind is that what she believes can be justified by appeal, 
say, to some more general moral principle. So we might say that a person's 
belief that she ought to support a local soup kitchen is morally justified and 
not mean that she is morally or epistemically or pragmatically justified in 
believing it, but instead that what she believes is both true and, say, justified 
by the more general duty we have to help others. We may even count what 
she believes as justified in light of moral principles we accept without thinking 
she either recognizes those principles or would endorse them if she did. In 
these cases we are not concentrating on her moral or epistemic or pragmatic 
justification for believing as she does, nor on what justification she might have 
for the belief, but rather on what grounds there might be (even if she doesn't 
have them) for the belief she holds—on what reason there might be for 
thinking it true. 
And in general, in our epistemic evaluations of peoples' beliefs, we stan-
dardly focus on what is believed rather than on the state or act of believing. 
Even when we are concerned with whether someone is epistemically justified 
in holding a belief, we are usually interested not primarily in her holding of 
the belief but in, for example, whether the belief she holds is supported by 
the evidence available to her, or in whether the belief is either self-evident 
or appropriately grounded in her experience. In these cases, we are interested 
in what justification she might have for the belief. In fact, the temptation is 
to maintain that whether a person is epistemically justified in holding the 
belief turns on whether the belief she is holding is itself justified, and that 
that turns on there being some suitable connection between what is believed 
and the evidence available to her. I will, in what follows, acquiesce to this 
temptation.I4  
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When it comes to epistemic justification, if we distinguish, in the way I've 
been suggesting, between when a person's belief is justified and when she is justified in holding it, we can capture the dependence of the latter on the 
former by saying: the person, if she is to be justified in holding some belief, 
must be holding it because it is justified—that the belief is justified must be 
part of the explanation of why she is holding it. If instead a person holds a 
belief because of wishful thinking or fear or carelessness, or in some other 
way without regard to the evidence she actually has, then her believing it is 
unjustified even if what is believed happens to be supported by the available 
evidence. On this view, no matter how strong the evidence for the belief might 
be, and regardless of whether the belief is true, the person is not justified in 
holding the belief, if her holding it is insensitive to the evidence.'' This basing 
requirement demands that a person's beliefs be based in an appropriate way 
on her evidence, if the beliefs are to count as justifiably held.' 
The distinction between a belief being justified and a person being justified 
in holding the belief is in some ways reminiscent of Kant's distinction between 
merely acting in accordance with duty and acting because it is one's duty." 
On Kant's view, a person is morally justified in acting only if both: (i) the 
action satisfies the Categorical Imperative; and (ii) that fact matters to whether 
the act would be performed. Pushing the analogy, we might identify an Episte-
mic Imperative to the effect that one should Believe only as the preponderance 
of one's evidence would allow. We can then say that a person is epistemically 
justified in holding some belief only if both: (i) the belief satisfies the Epistemic 
Imperative; and (ii) that fact matters to whether the belief would be held." 
And just as Kant's Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law doesn't require one to act on 
all such maxims, so too the epistemic imperative should be read not as requiring 
one to believe everything one's evidence would allow, but as requiring that 
one believe only as one's evidence would allow.' 
I think the Epistemic Imperative together with the basing requirement 
articulate one crucial dimension of the epistemic evaluation, and I will take 
them as capturing, albeit in quite general terms, the core of our notion of 
epistemically justified believing. But obviously there are other dimensions of 
epistemic evaluation. We evaluate people as more or less knowledgeable, in 
light of the extent to which what they (justifiably) believe is actually true; as 
more or less perceptive, in light of how sensitive they are to the world around 
them; as more or less sophisticated, in light of their ability to identify and 
deploy reasons for the beliefs they hold; and as more or less responsible, in 
fight of their efforts to gather and reflect on evidence. Each of these evaluations 
invokes standards that seem either to go beyond or to be completely indepen-
dent of the considerations that matter to justification. Often they impose a 
kind of epistemic strict liability (inappropriate to questions of justification) 
according to which how one fares epistemically does not turn on what one 
had reason to do or believe. Even though I set these other epistemic evalua-
tions aside in what follows, keeping them in mind is important when it comes 
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to sorting out the various ways a person who is justified in believing as she 
does might suffer significant shortcomings, epistemic and otherwise. 
In particular, recognizing that a person is epistemically justified in holding 
her beliefs may still leave us thinking the beliefs not just false but—as will 
often enough be the case with peoples' moral views—repugnant. A person 
might be epistemically justified in holding her beliefs, and yet be holding 
beliefs that are morally abhorrent, just as with more mundane matters a person 
might justifiably believe what turns out to be false)  Needless to say, a person 
who holds abhorrent beliefs will; in an important sense, not be holding the 
beliefs she should. Worse, she might, on the basis of those beliefs, act in 
deeply objectionable ways. But the grounds we have for thinking her actions 
immoral and her views horribly mistaken might (sadly) be unavailable to her; 
and if they are unavailable to her, and we recognize this, we may have to 
grant that she is epistemically justified in holding her position. 
Whether she is depends crucially on what evidence is available to her. I 
suspect that, in many cases, those who hold abhorrent views actually have 
volumes of evidence, to which they are insensitive, that stand against their 
convictions. To the extent they hold their views because of prejudice, or fear, 
or self-interest, or insecurity, they are not appropriately basing their beliefs on 
the available evidence and so are not justifiably holding their views (no matter 
how coherent their epistemically insensitive system of beliefs is). At least in 
principle, though, some people might be raised in an environment so distorted 
that the evidence they have, such as it is, actually supports their repugnant 
views. We will of course have reason to try to change their views and their 
behavior to the extent we can, and we certainly needn't think their beliefs are 
ones we might reasonably accept. Still, if their beliefs are supported by the 
evidence actually available to them, I think they are epistemically justified in 
holding them, even though they are morally the worse for their views?' 
Foundationalism and Coherentism 
Against this background, let's return to the question, now made more specific: 
What does it take for a person to be epistemically (as opposed to morally or 
pragmatically) justified in holding the belief she does? Under what conditions, 
for instance, would she be justified in accepting utilitarianism or in rejecting 
Naziism, or in thinking courage virtuous, or pleasure good? 
When concerned with belief in general, with no special focus on moral 
beliefs, answers have traditionally divided into two camps, one foundationalist, 
the other coherentist. Both approaches normally accept the basing require-
ment—the view that when the belief is justified a person is justified in believing 
as she does only if, in addition, she believes as she does because her belief is 
justified. Where the contrast between foundationalism and coherentism shows 
up is in their respective accounts of what it takes for a belief to be epistemi- 
cally justified.  
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The foundationalist's account involves appealing to some class of epis-
temically privileged beliefs (that enjoy their privilege independently of their 
inferential/evidential connections) and then holding that a belief, moral or 
otherwise, is justified if and only if either: (i) it is member of that privileged 
class; or (ii) it bears an appropriate evidential/inferential relation to a belief 
that is a member of the class.' 
Different versions of foundationalism emerge as different classes of belief 
are singled out as foundational and as different evidential/inferential relations 
are countenanced as appropriate. Just to mention a few of the familiar sug-
gestions, beliefs might count as foundational in virtue of being certain, or in-
corrigible, or formed under the appropriate circumstances, while an inferential 
relation might count as appropriate if it is deductive, or inductive, or abductive, 
or explanatory. Precisely how the details are filled in will make a huge differ-
ence to both the stringency of the requirements imposed and the plausibility 
of the theory that results. What all the versions share, though, is the view that 
there is an epistemically privileged class of beliefs that are justified indepen-
dently of the evidential/inferential relations they might bear to other beliefs 
and that all other beliefs are justified, when they are, in virtue of the support 
they receive from foundational beliefs. 
In characterizing foundationalism this way, I'm steering clear of attributing 
to found ationalism a number of more extreme views it often travels with—for 
instance, the view that all justification must flow unidirectionally from the foun-
dational beliefs to the others, and the view that the foundational beliefs are in-
fallible," and the view that a fully developed system of justified beliefs will take 
the shape either of a pyramid with all the foundational beliefs eventually 
supporting a single ultimate principle or of an inverted pyramid with a single 
foundational belief supporting the whole superstructure." While a foundation-
alist might ultimately be forced into one or another of these views by her own 
arguments, she might not be. What matters to her foundationalism, as I see 
it, is that she thinks there is a privileged class of noninferentially justified 
beliefs without which no other beliefs would be justified at all. 
Suppose, then, that some of our moral views are justified. Suppose that 
we are justified in thinking that cruelty is wrong, Naziism is evil, racism 
repugnant, kindness required, promises binding, or whatever. How would our 
justified moral beliefs (assuming there are some) fit into the foundationalist's 
picture of justification? Foundationalists who hold that some moral beliefs 
are justified must hold either that some moral beliefs are epistemically 
privileged or that, although none are, some moral beliefs are nonetheless 
justified inferentially by appeal ultimately to some nonmoral beliefs that are. 
The vast majority of foundationalists working in moral theory have gone 
the first route and embraced a moral foundation, holding that some of our 
moral beliefs qualify as epistemically privileged. Influenced by Hume's obser-
vation that one cannot legitimately infer an "ought" from an "is," they've held 
that our nonmoral beliefs, taken alone, can provide no evidence whatsoever for 
our moral convictions.25 
 There is, they think, an inferentially unbridgeable 
F 
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gap between nonmoral and moral beliefs (or at least between nonevaluative 
and evaluative beliefs). 
Whether Hume himself thought the problems plaguing such an inference 
were insuperable is controversial. But his responsibility for making those 
problems felt is beyond question. In any case, as Hume saw the issue, the 
problems center on the transition from claims about what is the case (e.g., that 
God commands something, or that a course of action will produce happiness, or 
that the majority of people approve of some trait) to claims concerning what 
ought to be done or what should be approved. Take whichever nonevaluative 
premises you like concerning how things are, were, or will be, and it seems 
(Hume suggested) that no conclusion follows concerning how they ought to 
be, absent the aid of an evaluative premise. Suppose, for instance, that some 
course of action would promote happiness. From that it doesn't follow that 
people should so act—unless we appeal to an additional evaluative premise, 
e.g., that people should act so as to promote happiness. Of course, it might 
be that an appropriate additional premise is true. The point is that apparently 
some moral premise or other is needed to secure a moral conclusion from 
nonmoral premises. If this is right, it means that, on a foundationalist's view 
of justification, the only way any of our moral beliefs could be justified is if 
some of them are epistemically privileged—otherwise they are all ultimately 
unjustifiable. The central problem facing such a position is to make plausible 
the suggestion that at least some moral beliefs are properly viewed as epistemi-
cally privileged. And this is no small problem since all the concerns that raise 
general epistemic worries about our moral views devolve onto any particular 
proposal one might make to the effect that some subset of those views is 
epistemically privileged. 
In any case, among those who think some moral beliefs are foundational, 
many have treated the privileged moral beliefs as roughly on a par with 
perceptual judgments and suggested that the justification of our various moral 
principles parallels the kind of justification our scientific principles receive from 
perception.26  Others have thought that our privileged moral beliefs concern, 
instead, the most general and abstract principles of morality, and that these 
in turn serve to justify (or not) our other beliefs deductively. The crucial 
difference between these views is found primarily in the kind of inferential 
support each believes the foundational beliefs provide for the others. I think 
the difference is more or less fairly captured by saying the first group treats 
the justification of our nonfoundational beliefs as involving inductive, abduc-
tive, and explanatory considerations, whereas the other treats the justification 
of nonfoundational beliefs as a matter of showing that they follow deductively, 
with the help of nonmoral assumptions, from the foundational beliefs. Either 
way, at least some moral , beliefs—the foundational ones—are held to be 
justified independently of whatever inferential/evidential relations they might 
bear to other beliefs. 
Coherentists, in contrast, reject precisely this view, maintaining that what-
ever justification our moral beliefs enjoy is due to the relations they bear to 
other things we believe. Those who think the gap between nonmoral and 
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moral beliefs (or at least between nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs) is 
forever unbridgeable, maintain that all our moral beliefs receive what justifica 
tion they have only from other moral (or at least evaluative) beliefs. Others, 
though, hold that, whatever the nature of the "is"/"ought" gap, it does not 
work to insulate completely our moral judgments from nonmoral (and non-
evaluative) considerations. On their view, metaphysical, epistemological, so-
cial, and psychological considerations might all be relevant to the justification 
of our moral views. Significantly, defenders of this version of moral coher-
entism needn't hold that nonmoral beliefs alone either entail or in some other 
way inferentially support moral conclusions; they may well hold that our moral 
views themselves establish the epistemic relevance of nonmoral considera-
tions. This means that a coherentist can accept all the standard arguments for 
the "is"/"ought" gap without being committed to holding that all the evidence 
we have for our moral views come from moral considerations. In fact, given 
just how implausible it is to see any of our moral views as epistemically 
privileged, a great attraction of coherentism is its ability to make sense of our 
moral views being (to a greater or lesser extent) justified even in the face of 
the "is"/"ought" gap. 
It's worth mentioning that an epistemological coherentist might well end 
up holding a kind of (nonepistemic) foundationalism with respect to morality. 
Here I have in mind a view that defends, on coherentist grounds, the idea 
that there is some single criterion for, or some fundamental principle of, 
morality. Someone might argue that an action is right if and only if it would 
be approved by the agent on full and informed reflection and then rely on 
considerations of what an agent would approve under those conditions to 
defend certain moral principles. Or someone might similarly rely on the view 
that an action is right if and only if it would be rational for the agent to 
perform it; or if and only if it is licensed by rules people could rationally agree 
to; or if and only if it satisfies the Categorical Imperative; or if and only if it 
maximizes overall utility; or if and only if it accords with God's will. In a 
perfectly reasonable sense, each of these views proposes a "foundation" for 
morality. Yet the arguments standardly offered in their defense regularly 
appeal, in just the way coherentism would predict, to a wide variety of other 
considerations (concerning what people value, how they reason, the effect 
their attitudes have on their actions, the authority they accord to their moral 
views) as evidence for the fundamental principle in question. For all coher-
entism says, any one of these proposals might be true. Moreover, any one of 
them might be justifiably believed by a coherentist. What coherentism is 
committed to is the claim that, if any one of these views is justifiably believed 
by a person, it will, and must, be in light of what else she believes. None of 
these views, and no other view, is justified except in this way (according to 
the coherentist). 
The heart of the difference between found ationalism and coherentism, as 
the distinction applies generally, is found in coherentism's rejection of the 
view that there is an epistemically privileged subset of beliefs (moral or not), 
and its rejection of the view that all other beliefs are justified only in virtue 
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of the relations they bear to such privileged beliefs. This difference turns on 
what foundationalism asserts and coherentism denies.' Yet coherentism goes 
beyond the denial and offers a positive account of what it takes for a person's 
belief to be epistemically justified.' 
The coherentist's positive account involves articulating a conception of 
what it is for one belief to cohere with others, and then arguing that a person's 
belief is epistemically justified only if, and then to the extent that, the belief 
in question coheres well with her other beliefs. There is, on the coherentist's 
view, no subset of beliefs that counts as epistemically privileged (at least none 
whose privilege is independent of the inferential connections its members 
bear to other beliefs). Instead, beliefs, moral and otherwise, enjoy whatever 
epistemic credentials they have thanks to the evidential/inferential relations 
they bear to other beliefs. The more and better the relations, the greater the 
degree of coherence enjoyed by the set and the stronger the justification. 
Predictably, different versions of coherentism emerge as different evidential/ 
inferential relations are countenanced as appropriate.' Also predictably, pre-
cisely how the details are filled in will make a huge difference to both the 
stringency of the requirements imposed and the plausibility of the theory that 
results. What all the versions share, though, is the view that the extent to 
which a belief is justified turns simply on the evidential/inferential relations 
it bears to other beliefs. 
In characterizing coherentism in this way, I am steering clear (as I did 
with foundationalism) of attributing to it some of the more extreme views it 
often travels with—for instance, the view that all justification is global and 
nonlinear, and the view that to be justified in believing anything a person 
must believe of her beliefs that they form a coherent system, and the view 
that coherence itself provides evidence that a system of belief is likely to be 
true. While a coherentist might ultimately be forced into one or another of 
these views by her own arguments, she might not be. What matters to her 
coherentism, as I see it, is that she thinks (negatively) that there is no epistemi-
cally privileged class of beliefs and (positively) that beliefs are justified only 
if, and then to the extent that, they cohere well with the other beliefs one holds. 
To forestall a natural confusion, I should emphasize that coherentism, no 
less than foundationalism, can admit that not all of our beliefs, not even all 
of our justified beliefs, are actually inferred from others. We often believe 
things thanks to the promptings of experience, for example, even though we 
do not infer what we believe from anything else we already believe. Such 
beliefs are, in an important sense, cognitively spontaneous. Yet the fact that 
they are caused in the way they are doesn't preclude them from standing in 
various inferential/evidential relations to the other things we believe.' And 
it is how they stand, visa vis these other beliefs, that on the coherentist's 
account determines whether they are justified." 
I am going to put off, for a time, offering a positive account of coherence 
and its relation to justification, turning first to one argument, the regress 
argument, that is commonly thought to show that no version of coherentism 
has a chance of being right regardless of the specific account of coherence it 
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offers. I will, in the next two sections, argue that a coherentist can consistently 
recognize the force of the regress argument and yet satisfyingly stop the regress 
without having her position collapse into a version of foundationalism. With 
that argument made, I will then offer a positive account of coherence as a 
backdrop for replying to several other objections to coherentism many have 
found persuasive. 
The Regress Argument 
The regress argument is by far the most influential argument against both 
coherentism in general and coherentism as applied to our moral beliefs. As 
this argument would have it, if any beliefs are justified at all, some must be 
justified independently of the relations they bear to other beliefs. In other 
words, coherentism has got to be false. 
The argument, which goes back at least to Aristotle,32  begins with the 
assumption that one belief provides justification for another only if it is, 
itself, justified. For any given belief, then, the question arises: what sort of 
justification does it enjoy? If it is justified by other beliefs from which it is 
inferable, then the beliefs on which its justification depends must themselves 
be justified and we can raise the same question about them, and then again 
about whatever beliefs justify those. If we are to avoid an infinite regress, 
there are only two possibilities (compatible with holding that the initial belief 
is justified). Either: 
(i) The path of justification from one belief to thos,e from which it is 
inferable, to those from which they are inferable, leads back to the initial 
belief, in which case , the justification comes objectionably full circle; or 
(ii) There are some justified beliefs that are justified independently of the 
support they might receive from others (say, because they are self-justifying 
or because they are justified by something other than a belief, perhaps an 
experience), in which case the regress can be satisfyingly stopped. 
Foundationalists have taken comfort from this argument thinking, first, 
that coherentism is saddled with defending some version of the apparently 
indefensible (i) and, second, that the kind of beliefs their theories identify as 
epistemically privileged would play just the role that (ii) makes clear needs 
to be filled. 
Skeptical and, nonskeptical foundationalists alike have relied on the regreis 
argument to attack coherentism. According to nonskeptical foundationalists, 
there are in fact beliefs that can stop the regress, and they serve as the 
foundation on which the justification of all other beliefs depends. According 
to skeptical foundationalists, there are no such beliefs (concerning the domain 
in question), so although foundationalism provides the correct account of 
what it would take for beliefs to be justified, no relevant belief is in fact 
justified—regardless of what other beliefs one holds." 
Against both skeptical and nonskeptical foundationalists, coherentists hold 
(at least) one of three things: that the way in which one's justification for a 
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belief might come full circle is not, after all, objectionable; or that a coherentist 
might, despite appearances, acknowledge that there are some justified beliefs 
that are justified independently of the support they might receive from others; 
or that there's some third option. Although I am tempted by the first option, 
in the course of what follows I shall defend the second as available to a 
coherentist. To that end, I'll argue that on one interpretation the initial assump-
tion of the regress argument (that one belief can justify another only if it is, 
itself, justified) makes the argument too strong even for a foundationalist 
to resist, while on another interpretation a coherentist can, consistent with 
coherentism, stop the regress in the same way a foundationalist can---by appeal 
to beliefs that are justifiably, held despite their having no inferential support. 
Either way, the regress argument won't work to support foundationalism as 
over against coherentism. 
Now nonskeptical foundationalism has commonly been thought to face at 
least three significant difficulties. First, there seem to be no uncontroversial 
candidates for the role of foundational belief. Second, even if there were some 
plausible candidates, the foundation they would provide would, as many think, 
be too paltry to support anything like the number and kind of beliefs we take 
to be justified. And third, once we distinguish between a belief being justified 
and a person being justified in holding a belief, it looks as if even putatively 
foundational beliefs won't stop the regress, because people won't justifiably 
hold them in the absence of evidence, and that evidence, in turn, must be such 
that they are justified in accepting it—and that simply re-invites the regress. 
All three difficulties have been taken, at various times, by various people, 
to pose insuperable difficulties for anyone hoping to establish the nonskeptical 
view that our beliefs are sometimes justified. While I will briefly discuss each 
of the worries, the third is, I will suggest, eventually the most telling (although 
not in the form it usually takes). And the right response to the difficulty, I 
will argue, is not to embrace a skeptical foundationalism but to reject the 
view that justified belief requires the sort of privileged beliefs foundationalism 
champions. Let me go through the difficulties in order. 
First, as I've said, many have thought that there are no beliefs that might 
plausibly be treated as foundational. This problem has seemed especially 
pressing since, traditionally, foundational beliefs have been credited with all 
sorts of wonderful properties, with being, for instance, infallible, or indubi-
table, or incorrigible, or certain.. The more exalted the claims made on their 
behalf, the less plausible it is that any belief lives up to the claims. Yet 
foundational beliefs needn't have any especially dramatic properties .to stop 
the regress. They needn't be infallible, nor indubitable, nor incorrigible, nor 
certain. All they need to be is: justified not on account of the inferential 
relations they bear to other beliefs. They can even work to stop the regress 
if what justification they do have is both over-ridable (in the face of the 
inferential implications of other beliefs) and underminable (in certain contexts 
where their presumptive justification disappears). As long as there are some 
beliefs that are justified independently of any support they may receive from 
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other beliefs, the regress can be brought to a halt. That there might be such 
beliefs is at least plausible, one might grant. 
It could be that our beliefs to the effect that we feel pain, or see red, or 
seem to be thinking, or (to move to beliefs with a moral content) that cruelty 
is wrong, or courage honorable, or pleasure good, are each justifiably believed, 
independently of the support they might receive from other beliefs, as long 
as they are neither over-ridden by contrary evidence nor undermined by the 
circumstances. Each of these, one might think, could serve as suitable stopping 
places in an otherwise infinite regress of justification. 
But then, second, to the extent these beliefs, or some others, are plausible 
candidates for stopping the regress, people have thought such beliefs would 
be so few in number or so narrow in scope or so devoid of implications that 
only a very small percentage of the beliefs we're inclined to think are justified 
actually are. So even if wholesale skepticism goes too far, the few beliefs that 
(let us grant) are justified independently of the inferential relations they bear 
to others, and the few beliefs they might adequately support, apparently 
constitute an embarrassingly small collection of relatively little interest. We 
may then be justified in believing a few things, the worry goes, but we are 
likely to have on this view no justification for our beliefs about the external 
world, about other minds, about the future, or about substantive moral issues. 
A reasonable response to this worry, though, is not to think that such beliefs 
are unjustified, but rather to think the worry arises only if one over-constricts 
one's view either of which beliefs count as foundational or of what those 
beliefs might serve to support. The nonskeptical foundationalist can, with more 
than a little plausibility, maintain that any theory that purports to articulate our 
notion of justification has got to be wrong if it has as an implication that 
virtually none of our everyday beliefs are ever justified. 
Finally, third, it has seemed to many that we shouldn't in any case grant 
what I've been allowing for the sake of the argument: that there might be 
beliefs that could be justifiably held in any way independent of the relations 
they bear to other beliefs. For it looks as if, whatever beliefs a found ationalist 
settles on as appropriate regress stoppers, a person will be justified in holding 
the belief only if she has some evidence for it, some reason to think it true. This 
thought introduces a collection of arguments many have thought decisively 
undermine stopping the regress in the way the foundationalist proposes. Not 
all of the arguments in the collection are, I think, compelling. Working through 
the dialectic they introduce, however, is a useful way of showing, I'll suggest, 
that the best defense available to a found ationalist provides as well the re-
sources a coherentist needs to resist the regress argument. 
The first member of the collection of arguments appeals to the basing 
requirement and interprets it as demanding (what might be called) doxastic 
ascent. As this argument would have it, a person holds a belief because it is 
justified, and so satisfies the basing requirement, only if she both believes of 
it (the belief in question), that it has some epistemic credential, and holds the 
belief on those grounds.34  So, for someone to satisfy the basing requirement 
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when believing that there is something red before her, she must believe of 
her belief that, say, she formed it under the appropriate circumstances (e.g., 
in good light, and thanks to her visual apparatus working properly); and for 
her to satisfy the basing requirement when believing that some law is just she 
must believe of her belief, say, that she formed it under the appropriate 
circumstances as well (e.g., when free of the influence of self-interest, and 
thanks to her appreciating the law's real effects on all).35  
Interpreted in this way, the basing requirement is met only if a person has 
beliefs concerning her beliefs to the effect that they are justified or have some 
property in virtue of which they are justified. But that is to allege that her 
justifiably holding the first belief (whatever its content, regardless of her 
circumstances) requires that she have another, distinct, belief that serves to 
justify her holding it. Acknowledging that requirement is just to abandon the 
claim that the belief in question is appropriately foundational—even if it is 
infallible, or indubitable, or incorrigible, or certain, or whatever. Moreover, 
if the second order belief is to justify holding the "foundational" belief, it too 
must be justifiably held, and that requires yet another belief, this time concern-
ing it . and we're off on a new regress, but now with no hope of stopping 
it by appeal to beliefs that are justifiably held not in virtue of the inferential 
support they receive from other beliefs. Many coherentists have thought this 
argument establishes that foundationalists no less than coherentists must find 
a way out of the regress other than that provided by appealing to some 
privileged class of beliefs. 
Against this argument, a foundationalist might well, and I think would 
rightly, resist the proposed interpretation of the basing requirement. A founda-
tionalist can and should deny that to be justified in believing something we 
must believe of the belief that it is justified. What the requirement properly 
understood demands, the foundationalist should say, is that, if a person's 
holding of a belief is to count as justified, the belief must in fact be held 
because it is justified, but she needn't have any beliefs to the effect that her 
belief is justified. What matters is that she believes as she does because of 
her evidence rather than, say, because of wishful thinking or dogmatic faith. 
She needn't even be aware that her beliefs are regulated by her evidence, as 
long as they are. Thus a person may have a set of well-justified beliefs even 
if she is unaware of herself as a believer—as long as her beliefs are, in fact, 
themselves appropriately sensitive to the evidence she has.36 
 If this is right, a 
system of justified beliefs needn't have anywhere in it a belief to the effect 
that "My belief that   is   " Obviously, a person who lacks beliefs 
about her beliefs will not be in a position to offer a direct justification of her 
holding the beliefs she does, since she is (by hypothesis) unaware of herself 
as holding beliefs. Yet she would still be able to justify her particular beliefs; 
she would be able to offer reasons for believing as she does, by appealing to 
the available evidence (such as she believes it to be). 
Of course, once a person does acquire beliefs about her beliefs, all sorts 
of worries may emerge about her own reliability that can well and truly shake 
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up her justification. And, as it happens, we are all aware of ourselves and 
aware as well that we often form false beliefs. This fact about us means that 
the thought "I might in this case be mistaken" needs to be taken into account 
in evaluating the support our beliefs provide for one another. What self-
awareness as epistemic agents introduces into the mix is an ever-relevant 
concern with the possibility that we might be mistaken. Still, the thought that 
we might be mistaken, if we have no particular reason to think we actually 
are, presumably doesn't provide much reason in itself for thinking our view 
false, just as the thought that all the particles in a room might rush to one 
corner of it, doesn't provide much reason in itself for thinking they will. 
In any case, I think the foundationalist would be right to resist the demand 
for doxastic ascent as a condition on justifiable belief. But there is a variation 
on the first argument that captures its spirit without insisting on doxastic 
ascent. It picks up on the regress argument's initial assumption and turns it 
against foundationalism by insisting that a belief is not justifiably held at all 
unless one has at least some evidence for it—some reason to think it true 
(although the reason need not involve any claim about one's beliefs). A belief 
held without reason, the argument would have it, is not justifiably held. 
call this the epistemic ascent argument since, in demanding that each justified 
belief be backed by some reasons that support it, it suggests we should always 
be able to ascend from one belief to the reasons that back it. The upshot of 
this assumption seems immediately devastating to the foundationalist: a belief 
unsupported by other beliefs—the content of which constitute the available 
evidence—will be one believed for no reason and so will be unjustified. And 
this means it can't serve to stop the regress. The very immediacy of this upshot 
makes it plausible for the foundationalist to claim the argument in effect begs 
the question by assuming all justified beliefs are inferentially justified. In fact, 
the very point the foundationalist tries to make with the regress argument is 
that some beliefs must be justified independently of the support they receive 
from others. 
Two different moves are available to foundationalists here. Foundation-
alists might accept the argument's assumption that every belief justifiably held 
must be supported by reasons and yet maintain that some beliefs are justified 
by reasons that are not the contents of a belief.' Or they might reject the 
assumption and maintain that some beliefs are justified in the absence of any 
positive reason to believe them. 
Against the first option, I would press a version of what is often called 
internalism.m  This view starts with the observation that, when it comes to 
people being justified in believing as they do, the reasons they have for believing 
one way or another must be available to them. Then it contends that the 
reasons become appropriately available only when the considerations that 
count as reasons become the content of those people's beliefs (or the content 
of something so like a belief, for instance, "an awareness that . .", as not 
to be worth distinguishing from belief in this context}"' On this view, the 
considerations a person has for a belief come into her cognitive economy 
•- . 
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appropriately, and so become available to her, only thanks to being the content 
of some cognitive state.' 
An externalist who, for example, treats a person's beliefs as justified by 
the fact that they are appropriately caused (e.g., directly by experience or by 
a reliable belief-forming mechanism) will have to hold either that a person 
has no reason to believe as she nonetheless justifiably does, or that what 
reason she has might be unavailable to her despite its serving to justify her 
belief. The first is no help if we let stand the present argument's assumption 
that a belief is justified only if the person has some reason to hold it. The 
second commits one to saying implausibly that considerations unavailable to 
a person can count as reasons that person has for believing one way rather 
than another. 
Rejecting externalism is compatible, clearly, with acknowledging that when 
we recognize that someone's beliefs are appropriately caused, that fact might 
well provide us with reason to accept what she believes; just as, when we 
know someone's beliefs are not appropriately caused, we might have reason 
to reject what she believes even as we recognize her as justified in holding 
her (false) beliefs. Nevertheless, as long as she remains unaware of the causal 
pedigree of her belief, it seems strange, to say the least, to think that the 
pedigree provides her with any reasons whatsoever. It is that strange claim 
the externalist being considered here has to hold. 
Someone might suggest, though, that both coherence and the basing rela-
tion are, by my own account, reasons people have for believing as they do 
even when they have no beliefs concerning either of them. After all, I am 
committed to treating both as conditions on justified believing, and yet I admit, 
even insisted on behalf of the foundationalist, that a person might justifiably 
hold her beliefs without having beliefs about them, and so without believing 
of her beliefs either that they are coherent or that they satisfy the basing 
requirement. But this suggestion involves a crucial misunderstanding. Neither 
coherence nor the basing relation are offered as reasons for the person in 
question to believe anything (unless she comes to have beliefs concerning 
them). Of course, according to coherentism, what matters to the justification 
of her belief is the extent to which the belief being evaluated (as justified or 
not) coheres with her other beliefs, and what matters to her being justified 
in believing as she does is that her belief is appropriately based on her
. evidence. 
Yet what counts as a person's evidence for a belief is not its relative coherence 
with her other beliefs, nor her sensitivity to the evidence, but rather the 
content of those beliefs of hers that provide deductive, inductive, and explana-
tory support for the content of the belief in question. Relative coherence is 
a reflection of the extent of that support, not an extra bit of support. 
Foundationalists, however, might accept these points and admit that what 
count as reasons an agent has for believing must be the content of some belief 
or some suitably similar cognitive state. They still can and should take the 
second option and maintain that the epistemic ascent argument simply begs 
the question by assuming that, all justified beliefs are justified by something 
that provides a person with reason to believe as she does. The force of the 
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argument dissolves, they might say, once we distinguish between permissive 
and positive justification. A belief is permissively justified, the suggestion goes, 
, when a person does not have, on balance, reason to reject it '" whereas a belief  
is positively justified when a person has, on balance, positive reason to hold 
it. With this distinction in hand, the foundationalist can grant that, when we're 
talking about positive justification, no belief is justified unless a person has 
some evidence for it, and yet insist that, when it comes to stopping the regress, 
all that's needed are some permissively justified beliefs. 
Whether the regress can actually be stopped this way depends on how 
the assumption that starts the regress is interpreted. As originally put, that 
assumption was: one belief provides justification for another only if it is, itself, 
justified. With the distinction between permissive and positive justification on 
hand, though, we can distinguish two relevant readings of this assumption. 
On one reading, the assumption is: One belief provides positive justification 
for another only if it is, itself, positively justified. On the other, it is: One 
belief provides positive justification for another only if it is, itself, permissively 
justified." Read in the first way, the assumption makes an appeal to permis-
sively justified beliefs irrelevant, for on that interpretation beliefs that are 
merely permissively justified provide no positive justification. But this strong 
reading of the assumption isn't available to the foundationalist once she has 
accepted the internalist's claim that all positive support is provided by (the 
contents of) beliefs. On her own view, the privileged class of beliefs that are 
supposed to stop the regress (whatever they are) are themselves, at least 
initially, not justified by others—and that means they are not positively justi-
fied.' Fortunately, though, the second reading of the assumption is both strong 
enough to get the regress going and weak enough to allow the regress to come 
to an end in beliefs that require no others for their justification. Thus, by 
relying on the second reading of the assumption, the foundationalist is able 
to put the regress in motion without falling victim to its momentum. 
This distinction between permissive and positive justification, and the re-
sulting appeal to permissively justified beliefs, has at least three advantages. 
First, it can explain how the regress might be stopped; it comes to an end if 
and when we arrive at beliefs that are permissively justified. Second, it leaves 
room for regress-stoppers that, despite their "regress-stopping" role, might 
be both over-ridable and underminable; permissively justified beliefs will lose 
their status when, for instance, new evidence is acquired that tells against 
them. Third, it avoids saying that among a person's reasons for believing as 
she does are reasons constituted by considerations that are unavailable to her; 
whether a belief counts as permissively justified turns only on whether the 
other things she believes provide, on balance, evidence against the belief.44  
The foundationalist is thus well placed to argue that all we need, to stop 
the regress, are some permissively justified beliefs; the regress comes to an 
end when we appeal to the contents of beliefs we actually hold that we have 
(on balance) no reason to reject. There is no need for the foundationalist to 
attribute to them any special properties, and there may well be enough of 
them to support an extensive and plausibly rich set of inferentially justified 
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beliefs. This means an appeal to permissively justified beliefs as appropriate 
regress-stoppers serves the foundationalist well when it comes to avoiding the 
three difficulties, mentioned earlier, that regularly haunt foundationalism. It 
is, in any case, the only plausible position available to those who grant that 
what reasons a person has are always found in the contents of her beliefs. 
Strikingly, though, coherentists can admit permissively justified beliefs, 
and rely on them to stop the regress in just the way the foundationalist is 
proposing, without abandoning coherentism. Such a coherentist will still deny 
that there is an epistemically privileged set of beliefs that enjoy their privilege 
independently of their inferential connections—since which beliefs count as 
permissively justified depends upon the evidential/inferential relations they 
bear to others. Moreover, such a coherentist can continue to hold that what 
positive reason we have for any belief will still always depend solely on what 
other beliefs a person has. This sort of coherentism, then, grants the regress 
argument's initial assumption: that a belief can provide (positive) justification 
for another belief only if it is itself (permissively) justified. It grants as well 
that, to the extent an unacceptable regress threatens, it can be brought to a 
stop with the recognition that beliefs can be justified in either of two senses. 
What it denies is foundationalism's characteristic—and defining—claim that 
some beliefs (the regress stoppers) are epistemically privileged independently 
of the inferential/evidential relations they bear to other beliefs. It insists instead 
that whether a belief can serve to stop the regress, whether it counts as 
permissively justified or not, is fully determined by the evidential relations it 
bears to other beliefs, and that when it does so count it itself enjoys no positive 
justification, even as it is available to provide positive support for other beliefs. 
The coherentist won't hold that the permissively justified beliefs that bring 
the regress to a stop have anything else to recommend them independently 
of how they relate to other beliefs; their primary role is to provide the epistemic 
input—the initial bits of evidence—one justifiably relies upon in seeking out 
views that are positively justified. 
Nor will the coherentist say that every belief spontaneously formed will 
count as permissively justified. Even if one forms a belief noninferentially, 
say as a direct result of some experience, whether it counts as permissively 
justified will depend on what else one believes. If I turn my head and come 
to think there's a dog at my feet, the proven past reliability of beliefs of this 
kind gives me reason to trust this belief as well, and it will count as one I am 
positively (and not just permissively) justified in believing, even though it is 
cognitively spontaneous. Whereas, if I find myself yet again confident that 
this time, finally, I will win the lottery, I have ample reason to distrust the 
belief, and if I believe it any way, it will count as unjustified (and not permis-
sively justified at all). In the great majority of cases, we might expect, people 
will have various background beliefs that serve either to support or to under-
mine the new beliefs they just happen to find themselves with. 
And, standardly, any belief's status as merely permissively justified will 
be comparatively unstable, in that it is likely either to emerge as positively 
justified as it becomes intertwined with, and in various ways supported by, 
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other beliefs or to become unjustified as one discovers reasons not to trust 
it. Looked at over time, one's initially merely permissively justified beliefs 
will regularly get swept up by others so as to become positively justified (as 
we find reason to think them true) or get sifted out as unjustified (as we find 
reason to think them suspect). .  
Permissively Justified Beliefs and Positive Support 
As long as beliefs that are merely permissively justified can provide positive 
justification for other beliefs, foundationalists and coherentists alike can suc-
cessfully stop the regress, and the regress argument will tell not at all against 
coherentism. However, if permissively justified beliefs cannot provide positive 
justification, an appeal to permissively justified beliefs won't help either the 
coherentist or the foundationalist, when it comes to stopping the regress. 
So we need to ask: Can beliefs we have no reason to accept really provide 
positive support? The temptation is to think not. Even if some permissively 
justified beliefs (say, the visually prompted belief that there's something red 
in front of me) can serve to justify others (say, that there's something colored 
in front of me), it looks as if not all permissively justified beliefs can play this 
role. In fact, people often seem to hold beliefs that are apparently permissively 
justified (since they seem to have on balance no reason to reject them) that 
pretty clearly couldn't serve to justify any other belief. Wild hunches, weird 
forebodings, and spurious superstitions are, after all, commonplace; and per-
missively justified though they may be, such beliefs seem not at all able to 
justify those beliefs that are based on them. 
Now a foundationalist might step in at this point hoping to re-establish a 
role for epistemically privileged beliefs. Unlike coherentists, she is able to 
distinguish those permissively justified beliefs that can justify others from 
those that can't, by treating some as epistemically privileged and others not. 
She might hold that the difference is found in whether the person is being 
epistemically responsible in holding the belief or in whether the belief is 
properly caused by experience, or in whether it is suitably concerned with 
one's private experience. It is open to the foundationalist to hold that epistemic 
responsibility, or proper etiology, or appropriate content, might mark the 
difference between those permissively justified beliefs that can, and those that 
can't, provide positive justification for other beliefs. A coherentist, in contrast, 
has to say that all permissively justified beliefs can serve to justify other beliefs, 
if , she is to avoid a surreptitious appeal to privileged beliefs. 
Problems arise for the foundationalist, however, as soon as one turns to 
the question: Why do the specific features identified (whatever they are) 
make a difference to one's justification? Any attempt to distinguish between 
permissively justified beliefs that will and those that won't provide positive 
evidence seems inevitably to face a dilemma. 
In every case, the proposed grounds for drawing the distinction will either 
involve considerations that are potentially unavailable to the person in ques- 
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tion or not. If they do, then the account will involve, I'll argue, an implausible 
kind of externalism; if they don't, then by adducing considerations that are 
available to that person, the view will in the end not be able to mark a 
difference among permissively justified beliefs in a way that counts only some 
as capable of providing positive support for other beliefs. 
Suppose the foundationalist embraces externalism and (for instance) takes 
the etiology of the particular belief to be crucial to its ability to justify other 
beliefs. In a particular case, a person might then hold a belief that lacks the 
proper history and, yet be unaware of that fact. And so far as her evidence is 
concerned, the belief will be no different from other beliefs of hers that 
enjoy the proper history. When it comes to the evidence she has, her merely 
permissively justified beliefs are indistinguishable. That the difference would 
nonetheless make a difference to her being able justifiably to rely on her 
belief to justify others seems quite implausible. 
It's easy to imagine situations in which two people have the very same 
beliefs, rely on them identically in reaching various other beliefs, and so are 
apparently equally justified in what they believe, even though they differ 
(unbeknownst to them) in what originally caused their permissively justified 
beliefs. One of the two might be in the hands of an evil demon or entranced 
by a virtual reality machine while the other is not, or one might be experiencing 
a drug-induced hallucination while the other is really living the life the first 
imagines, or one might be undergoing an optical illusion indistinguishable 
("from the inside") from the accurate visual experiences the other is having.45  
In each of these cases, if we were to assume that only those beliefs with the 
proper etiology will serve to justify other beliefs, we would be committed to 
holding that those who have no reason whatsoever to think they are victims 
of deception, manipulation, drugs, or illusion, though they are, differ substan-
tially, in the justification they have for believing as they do, from those others 
who are not victims but who have exactly the same grounds available to 
them for believing as they do. No doubt they are not equally well-placed 
epistemically. No doubt too we have reason to distinguish between them. Yet 
when it comes to the justification each has for her own view, they appear to 
be identically situated. Similar concerns plague any other externalist proposal 
a foundationalist might offer as grounds for distinguishing among permissively 
justified beliefs when it comes to their ability to contribute positively to the 
justification of other beliefs. 
Alternatively, and for good reason, the foundationalist might avoid exter-
nalism and suggest marking the distinction between permissively justified 
beliefs that can, and those that can't, provide positive support, by appealing 
to considerations the person in question has available. But then the considera-
tions adduced will either tell against certain putatively permissively justified 
beliefs, and so establish the beliefs as not permissively justified at all, or tell 
in favor of certain beliefs, and so establish them as positively justified. If the 
first, if the person herself has reason not to hold the belief in question, then 
coherentist and foundationalist alike will rightly resist seeing the beliefs that 
are at issue as capable of establishing positive justification, since the beliefs 
are not even permissively justified. If the second, if the person has reason to 
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rely on the belief, then the belief is positively justified and we simply shift 
the issue back to the status of the considerations the foundationalist identifies 
and ask of them whether they can provide positive support. At some point, 
if an infinite regress is to be avoided, we will inevitably appeal to some 
permissively justified belief as providing positive support for others, but at 
this point with no grounds for saying that only some such permissively justified 
beliefs can play this role. 
Plainly, the objection I've pressed against the externalist proposal is not 
irresistible. One might want to insist that people who are identically situated 
so far as they can tell still differ when it comes to how justified they are in 
holding the view they share. And insisting on this would not be unmotivated, 
since otherwise one is committed to the still apparently counter-intuitive idea 
that beliefs one has no reason to hold might nonetheless provide grounds for 
holding other beliefs. Thus an important part of the coherentist's position 
turns on being able to defuse this concern. So let me turn to that. 
I suspect that resistance to the idea that permissively justified beliefs might 
provide positive support for other beliefs is bolstered substantially by the 
cases of wild bunches, weird forebodings, spurious superstitions, etc., that I 
have already mentioned. These seem to be cases where a person's permissively 
justified beliefs pretty clearly couldn't serve to justify others. Yet the appear-
ance is misleading, not usually because the beliefs can serve to justify others 
but because (when the cases are compelling) the beliefs are not actually 
permissively justified. A great many of the supposedly permissively justified 
beliefs we reject as unable to support others are beliefs we think the person 
herself has reason to suspect (even if she doesn't in fact suspect them). In 
fact, cases of wild hunches, weird forebodings, and spurious superstitions, 
count as wild, weird, and spurious, precisely because we think of the beliefs 
in question as ones the person has reason to reject. 
The same general point holds for cases that don't involve wild, weird, or 
spurious beliefs but instead appeal, say, to beliefs that a person recognizes to be 
unsupported in situations where (we think) they have reason to think support is 
needed (as when they should realize that the belief is, in the absence of positive 
evidence, unlikely to be true). All the time, our expectations concerning which 
background beliefs a person will naturally hold regularly influence our particular 
judgments concerning whether they are justified in relying on some putatively 
permissively justified belief to justify others. As the coherentist sees things, though, 
what matters to the person's justification is that she actually have those back-
ground beliefs, and if she doesn't, then they will neither tell against nor .support 
her beliefs. As coherentism would predict, even beliefs we consider to be wild, 
weird, or spurious are beliefs we simultaneously recognize to , be such that people, 
in another time or culture, would be justified in accepting. We are not, of course, 
thereby expressing an endorsement of what they believe, but we are acknowledg-
ing them as justifiably believing as they do given the evidence available to them. 
If we narrow our view to those beliefs that really are permissively justified—those 
the person in'question actually has no reason, on balance, to reject—the plausibil-
ity of seeing these beliefs as all capable of providing some positive support for 
others increases dramatically. 
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Still, one might be inclined to think that any belief one has, on balance, 
no reason to hold can't possibly serve to justify anything else. This will seem 
reasonable, even unavoidable, as long as we think of evidential relations 
roughly on the model of logical relations as simply justification preserving in 
the way logical relations are truth preserving. If evidential relations among 
beliefs serve merely as conduits of justification, one belief will receive positive 
support from others only to the extent those others themselves have some 
positive support to convey. On this view, some belief may, thanks to the 
support it receives from several other beliefs, itself enjoy more positive justifi-
cation than any of the others, yet the total positive justification it can enjoy 
is limited nonetheless by the positive justification those other beliefs collec-
tively have to offer. Underwriting this view of evidential relations is the 
intuition that one belief can be seen as epistemically valuable in light of the 
relation it bears to others only if the others are themselves epistemically 
valuable. Just as one action will count as good because of its consequences 
only if its consequences are good, so too some belief will count as positively 
justified by other beliefs only if those others are positively justified. Clearly, 
if this view is right, then beliefs that are merely permissively justified will be 
useless when it comes to providing positive support for others and an appeal 
to them won't serve to stop the regress on behalf of either foundationalists 
or coherentists. 
What the coherentist must say (and the foundationalist will have reason 
to say as well) is that the intuition, and the view of justification it underwrites, 
are mistaken. Fortunately, in ethics and in epistemology, there's an alternative 
view that has its own appeal: that the value of an action or a belief depends 
upon both what it is related to and, more importantly for our purposes, how 
it is related to them. The intuition here is that the value of the whole may 
not be a function of the value of its parts considered independently of how 
they are related." Just as things that are valueless considered in isolation may 
come to be related in such a way as to constitute something of significant 
value, so too beliefs that enjoy no positive justification considered in isolation 
may come to be evidentially related in such a way as to constitute a set of 
positively justified beliefs." 
The appeal of this alternative view depends upon our ability to see the 
evidential relations themselves as making a difference to the justifactory status 
of the beliefs they relate. They might be seen as making a difference in either 
of two ways: The relations themselves might work to enhance and not merely 
preserve justificatory value; or they might serve as a condition of the justifac-
tory value of the beliefs they relate. The first suggestion, which is the more 
straightforward (but I think in the end less attractive) one, would enable us 
to appeal to the justifactory value of the evidential relations when it comes 
to explaining how it is that a belief supported by another that is merely 
permissively justified may in light of the relation they bear to one another 
count as positively justified." The second suggestion would pick up on the 
fact that the common distinction between things that are good in themselves 
and things that are good for their consequences can be supplemented with a 
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distinction between things that are only conditionally good and those that 
are unconditionally good." The idea, then, would be that our beliefs, to the 
extent they are justified, are only conditionally justified—the condition being 
set by their being appropriately related to other beliefs the person has. Signifi-
cantly, this latter view needn't be accompanied by any commitment to there 
being beliefs (or evidential relations) that are unconditionally justified; it 
would be enough if some beliefs might be conditionally justified. In any case, 
either account would serve to explain how it is that a belief's being properly 
related to another that is only permissively justified might render it posi-
tively justified." 
A full story following up either suggestion would involve explaining the 
distinctive epistemic contribution the evidential relations are supposed to play. 
However the details go, the epistemic role of such relations—their status as 
evidential relations—will presumably be bound up with their having a system-
atic if indirect connection to truth. Of course, evidential relations won't be 
such that, when they hold among beliefs, the beliefs are thereby sure to be, 
or even likely to be, true. Rather, I suspect, the relations that are in fact 
evidential will be those determined by canons of reasoning that are truth 
conducive (and not just truth preserving) in that systematically respecting 
them would have the tendency of shifting views towards the truth in the long 
haul, given accurate information.51  Obviously, a person might respect the 
relevant canons of reasoning over time and so hold beliefs that are evidentially 
related (on this view) and yet, because of lack of evidence, or misleading 
evidence, actually consistently have evidence for false views. But in these 
cases, as well as happier ones, if the beliefs are in fact supported by the 
weight of the evidence available to the person, they count as justified, at least 
according to the coherentist." In any case, while coherentism is committed 
to there being a fact of the matter as to whether, and to what extent, two 
beliefs are evidentially related, it is not wedded to any particular account of 
those evidential relations. 
As should be clear, coherentism, at least the kind I'm advancing, grants 
that there are conditions on justifiable believing that may hold (or not) inde-
pendently of what a person has reason to think. In particular, to the extent 
coherentism defines the relative coherence of a set of beliefs in terms of 
relations among those beliefs (that a person might have no beliefs concerning), 
the coherentist must accept a kind of externalism about justification." Whether 
a person's beliefs are actually appropriately related turns on considerations 
that might be unavailable to her. The appropriate evidential relations might 
hold when she has no beliefs concerning them, or in cases where she thinks 
they don't, or they might fail to hold even in cases where she thinks they do 
hold. What matters is that her beliefs are appropriately related, not that she 
thinks they are; and if she does think they are, whether that belief is itself 
justified will turn on whether it is appropriately related to her other beliefs, 
not on whether she thinks it is. 
Importantly, though, the externalism here concerns not what counts as a 
person's reasons for believing as she does but rather what counts as a justified 
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belief. Nor does it allow that people identically situated, when it comes to 
the evidence available to them, might differ in the justification they have for 
holding their beliefs. This sort of externalism is virtually unavoidable if we 
hope to get any purchase on there being a difference between some belief 
being justified and a person thinking of it as justified. Even if we were to end 
up advancing criteria of justification that are sensitive to the criteria the person 
in question accepts, we would need to distinguish between a belief satisfying 
those criteria and a person thinking it does. 
The Nature and Role of Coherence 
To address several of the concerns one might have about the coherence theory 
of justification, I need now to say something more specific about the connection 
between the relative coherence of a set of beliefs and the evidential/inferential 
relations that hold among the beliefs. According to coherentisrn, I've said, a 
belief is justified only if, and then to the extent that, it coheres well with the 
other things the person believes." Along the way, though, I've also attributed 
to the coherentist the view that a belief is (i) permissively justified if and only 
if the weight of the evidence available to the person does not, on balance, 
tell against the belief; and (ii) positively justified if and only if the weight of 
the evidence, again on balance, tells in favor of the belief (just how positively 
justified it is will be a matter of how strong the evidence, on balance, is). 
Seeing how these characterizations of justification relate to one another is 
crucial to seeing the sort of coherence theory I am advancing. 
How then does the relative coherence of a set of beliefs reflect the eviden-
tial relations that hold among those beliefs? And how does the relative coher-
ence of one's beliefs relate to their being justified? I will take these questions 
in order. 
The relative coherence of a set of beliefs is a matter of whether, and to 
what degree, the set exhibits (what I will call) evidential consistency, connected-
ness, and comprehensiveness." The first, evidential.consistency, sets a necessary 
and sufficient condition for (minimal) coherence, while the second and third, 
connectedness and comprehensiveness, serve, when present, to increase the 
relative coherence of a set that is minimally coherent. Each, though, is a 
property of a set of beliefs, if it is at all, only in virtue of the evidential relations 
that hold among the contents of the beliefs in the set 
Thus, a set of beliefs counts as (minimally) coherent if and only if the set 
is evidentially consistent—that is, if and only if the weight of the evidence 
provided by the various beliefs in the set don't tell, on balance, against any 
of the others.5' Given an evidentially consistent, and so at least minimally 
coherent, set, just how coherent the set is will be a matter of the connectedness 
and comprehensiveness it exhibits. 
Clearly, a set of beliefs can count as minimally coherent even if none of 
the beliefs in the set are evidentially supported by any of the others. However, 
an evidentially consistent (and so coherent) set might contain some beliefs 
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that are, to a greater or lesser extent, evidentially related to others in the set 
in a way that means they, on balance, receive support from the others, or 
provide support for. them, or both. In these cases, the evidential relations 
among the beliefs induce in the set some degree of what I've called connected-
ness. The stronger and more extensive the support, the more connected, and 
more coherent, the set. Thus, a set will be more or less coherent, assuming it 
is evidentially consistent, to the extent the beliefs in it enjoy positive support 
from others in the set. At the same time, for any given set that is at least 
minimally coherent, its relative coherence, because comprehensiveness, will 
increase when other beliefs are added to the set, assuming it remains eviden-
tially consistent. The more comprehensive the set, other things equal, the 
more coherent it will be." 
It goes without saying that virtually no one's total set of beliefs will count 
as even minimally coherent, although subsets of those beliefs will presumably 
count as more than minimally coherent. Similarly, virtually no one holds 
beliefs all of which are justified, although subsets of most peoples' beliefs will 
presumably count as positively and not just permissively justified. 
When it comes to relating the relative coherence of a person's beliefs to 
their status as justified beliefs, the coherentist's suggestion is, first, that those 
beliefs of hers that are justified are all and only those that belong to the 
subset of her beliefs that is maximally coherent and, second, that a belief will 
belong or not to that subset in virtue of the evidential relations it bears to 
everything else she believes. A subset of a person's beliefs will count as 
maximally coherent only if it is evidentially consistent and then if, when 
compared to all the subsets of her total belief set that are evidentially consis-
tent, it exhibits a greater degree of coherence over-all (thanks to its connected-
ness and comprehensiveness) than do the others." 
If a person has a belief that is evidentially related to no others, it will 
belong to the maximally coherent subset of her beliefs (because any subset 
not containing it would be less comprehensive and so less coherent than one 
that differed from that set only by including it) and will count as permissively 
justified. If she has, as she presumably will, a belief that is evidentially related 
to others, whether it will count as justified merely permissively, or positively, 
or not at all, will turn on whether it and the beliefs to which it is related are 
members of the maximally coherent subset of her beliefs. It may be that the 
belief, but not those that are evidentially related to it, will be a member of 
that set, in which case it will count as permissively but not positively justified. 
It may be, though, that it along with at least some of the others that support 
it are members of that maximally coherent subset, in which case it will count 
as positively justified in virtue of the positive support it receives from them 
(whether or not those others are themselves positively justified). Or it may 
be that it, and the beliefs that support it, are (even taken together) such that 
the weight of the evidence provided by other things the person believes tells 
against them, in which case, though a person has some evidence for the belief 
neither it, nor the beliefs that provide the evidence she has for it, count 
as justified. 
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One consequence of this view is that even beliefs one is unjustified in 
holding will, when held, nonetheless count as providing evidence for believing 
other things. That they provide evidence for believing other things, though, 
doesn't mean that they are permissively justified, since the person herself has 
reason not to accept them. Nor does it mean that the beliefs they provide 
evidence for will count as positively justified, since the considerations that tell 
against the original beliefs undercut the support they provide to others. 
If, for instance, I have an unjustified belief that there will be a draught in 
Guatemala (unjustified because the evidence actually available to me tells 
against it), that belief, along with some others, will provide me with some 
reason to think coffee prices will rise. If I then do believe that coffee prices 
will rise, I will have some reason. Yet that new belief, like the (by hypothesis) 
unjustified one on which it depends, is presumably unjustified in light of the 
other things I believe. Not every belief a person has some reason to hold 
counts as a justified belief. Still, and perhaps at first disturbingly, if in time I 
acquired a quite formidable subset of beliefs built originally in light of some 
unjustified beliefs, there could in principle come a time when I am justified 
in jettisoning the old beliefs in light of the newer ones. This is not what usually 
happens, but it happens often enough to bear notice. The process I have in 
mind shows up nicely when one justifiably abandons a previously well-sup-
ported and impressive scientific theory (perhaps, but not necessarily, in favor 
of another) in the face of accumulated anomalies. Originally, one is justified 
in rejecting each of the anomalies as misleading (as illusions, distortions, or 
inaccurate observations) in light of one's well established theory; however, as 
the anomalies mount, the case against the original theory builds eventually 
to the point (at least sometimes) where one is justified in accepting the collec-
tion of anomalies as accurate observations and unjustified in continuing to 
accept the original theory." 
How well a particular belief coheres with the other things the person 
believes, we can now say, is determined by whether it is a member of the 
maximally coherent subset of what she believes (it doesn't count as cohering 
at all if it is not), and if it is, whether, and to what extent, it is evidentially 
supported by other beliefs in that set (the more support it receives the better 
it coheres). Any belief in the set will at least be permissively justified, and 
will be more or less positively justified as it receives more or less evidential 
support from other beliefs in the set. Thus, to say that a belief is justified only 
if, and then to the extent that, it coheres well with the other things the person 
believes, is to register the way in which one's justification turns on how one's 
relief relates evidentially to whatever else one believes. 
A full articulation of the coherence theory I've been describing would of 
:curse involve developing a theory of what relations count as evidential. And 
learly this is not the place to begin that project. But I should emphasize that 
tny plausible theory of justification will require supplementation by an account 
evidential relations, since all such theories recognize and rely in some way 
n- other on there being evidential relations that our beliefs might bear to 
)ne another. 
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The extent to which a particular belief is justified, incidentally, does not 
always vary with the relative coherence of the set of beliefs to which it belongs. 
A belief does not enjoy an increase in justification simply because the set to 
which it belongs has increased in coherence. To see why, imagine a person 
holds some isolated belief—say, that she is feeling pain now—that is consistent 
with everything else she believes, but not connected (evidentially or inferen-
tially) with them. As things stand, the belief minimally coheres with the 
person's other beliefs but bears no evidentially relevant connection to them. 
Suppose that the person then acquires new evidence in support of those other 
beliefs so that her justification for holding them increases. As long as the 
isolated belief remains consistent with the new set, it remains justifiably be-
lieved. Yet the person's justification for believing it has not changed one bit; 
an overall increase in the coherence of her beliefs leaves the evidentially 
isolated belief as it was before. No doubt, truly isolated beliefs are a rarity, 
but if they are possible then the coherence of one's set of beliefs might increase 
or decrease without making a difference to one's justification in holding some 
beliefs (the isolated ones). Even so, because beliefs that are isolated at one 
point might, with the acquisition of new evidence, be connected with others, 
isolation should not be confused with insulation. The justifactory status of the 
currently isolated beliefs will remain, as before and always, dependent upon 
what else one believes. 
Against this background, we can also characterize what it would be for a 
potential belief to cohere well with what a person actually believes. Whether 
such a belief would cohere at all with the other beliefs a person holds depends 
on whether, were the person to believe it, it would then be a member of the 
(perhaps, in light of the new belief, dramatically different) maximally coherent 
subset of everything she believes. And how well such a belief would cohere 
with the others depends on the degree to which the resulting maximally 
coherent set would be more coherent than its predecessor. If such a belief 
would cohere with whatever else she believes, then should she believe it, the 
belief would be justified.' 
To say, though, that a belief is such that, should one hold it, the belief 
would be justified, is not to say that one should hold the belief. The Epistemic 
Imperative requires that we believe only as the evidence allows, it doesn't 
demand that we believe everything the evidence allows. This means a potential 
belief that would be justified if held, might, compatible with the Imperative, 
nonetheless not be believed. What is ruled out as unjustified is believing those 
things the available evidence, on balance, tells against.' 
With that earlier discussion in mind, it is perhaps also worth emphasizing 
that the coherence theory is being advanced here as an account of what it is 
for a person's belief to be justified, not as an account of what it is for a person 
to be justified in holding some belief. A belief might belong to the maximally 
coherent subset of a person's beliefs, and so count as a justified belief, even 
if the person is not justified in believing it. An account of when a person is 
justified in believing something that is, in fact, well supported by the evidence 
available to her will come only when a suitably articulated version of the 
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basing requirement is added to the view. Roughly speaking, though, and 
according to coherentism, for a person to be justified in holding a belief, she 
has to believe it because it coheres well with her other beliefs (though she 
needn't believe it coheres)." 
Some Objections 
I can't here do full justice to the range of objections that have been raised to 
coherentism. However, I would like to indicate the extent to which some of 
the more common objections miss their mark, at least when it comes to the 
version of coherentism I am advancing. The objections I have in mind are 
that coherentism has got to be false because the mere fact that a set of beliefs 
is coherent is no reason to think they are true; that coherentism is objectionably 
conservative and inappropriately privileges one's actual beliefs; and that coher-
entism fails to recognize sufficiently the importance of experience. I will take 
these objections in order and suggest that each either misunderstands coher-
entism or underestimates the resources available to it 
Aside from the regress argument, the most common objection to coher-
entism turns on noticing that for any coherent set of beliefs a person might 
actually hold, there's another possible set of beliefs that is equally or more 
coherent." This observation raises two concerns: First, isn't coherentism com-
mitted to the obviously false view that the mere coherence of a set of beliefs 
is reason to think them true; and second, isn't the coherentist consequently 
unable to account for the fact that we can justifiably reject views we recognize 
to be more coherent than our own? These concerns are all the more pressing 
because it looks as if we have exceedingly strong inductive grounds for thinking 
that any coherent set of beliefs, our own included, is likely to be false." 
To respond to these worries we need to distinguish two questions: What 
is it for a belief to be justified? and What is it that justifies a belief? Coher-
entism, of the sort I am defending, is addressed to the first question but not 
the second—a belief is justified if and then to the extent that it coheres well 
with a person's other beliefs, but it is not justified by the fact that it is a 
member of a coherent set of beliefs. What a person's beliefs are justified by 
are her other beliefs—or, more accurately, by the facts, as she takes them to 
be, so far as they provide evidence for her view. 
A useful analogy can be found in the expected utility theory of rational 
choice. According to that theory, a person's choice is rational if and only if, 
given the available options, the choice maximizes her expected utility. But 
the fact that the option maximizes her expected utility is not an extra reason 
for the person to choose it—rather its status as the option that maximizes 
expected utility is a reflection of (what the theory supposes to be) the reasons 
the person has for choosing it.65 
 Now of course one might have all sorts of 
objections to this theory, and I don't rest my case for the coherence theory 
on the acceptability of rational choice theory. Far from it. Still, I do want to 
suggest that the relation between expected utility and the reasons an agent 
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has for making one choice over another (according to this theory) provides 
a nice analogue to the relation between relative coherence and the reasons a 
person has for holding one belief rather than another. As the analogy would 
have it, the fact that a belief coheres better than do the available alternatives 
with a person's other beliefs is not an extra reason for the person to hold 
it—rather its status as the belief that maximizes coherence is a reflection of 
the reasons the person has for holding it. So thought of, the coherence theory 
is not committed to saying that the coherence of our beliefs is a reason to 
think they are true. Instead, what evidence we have for the truth of our beliefs 
is found in, and only in, what else we believe. This means a coherentist can 
and should admit that the mere fact that a set of beliefs is coherent provides 
one with no reason to think they are true, even though, if the beliefs in 
question are one's own, their relative coherence will reflect the extent to which 
one's evidence gives one reason to think they are true. 
Just as the maximizing theory of rationality doesn't offer substantive rea-
sons for a person to act, so too the coherence theory doesn't offer substantive 
reasons for a person to believe or not. In both cases, the theories are offered 
as accurate and informative characterizations of the link between what we 
value or believe and the rationality or justification of what we do or believe. 
In each case, the plausibility of the theory depends, of course, on whether it 
actually captures the conditions under which someone counts as having chosen 
rationally or believed with justification. While I have my doubts about the 
theory of rationality on that front, I think the coherence theory of justification 
does a surprisingly good job. 
What, then, does the coherentist say about those situations in which one 
recognizes that someone else holds a view that is more coherent than is one's 
own? If justification is a matter of coherence, shouldn't I abandon my beliefs 
if I discover there is an alternative set of beliefs that is more coherent? The 
coherentist does have to hold that, if the person's beliefs really are more 
coherent, then that person has more justification for believing as she does, 
given her evidence, than one has for one's own view. However, acknowledging 
this is not yet to say that one has any reason to reject one's views in favor of 
hers, not least of all because the mere fact that her view is more coherent is 
no reason to think it true, but also because her evidence, such as it is, might 
justifiably be rejected by you as misleading, ill informed, or otherwise unaccept-
able (even if the other person is justified in relying on it). 
Often, of course, the alternative coherent views, at least those we take 
seriously, will be ones that we ourselves see some reason to accept, even if 
we think on balance the evidence tells against them. To take a moral example: 
Suppose that concerning various matters I am inclined to think consequen-
tialist considerations are relevant and often decisive. I think, for instance, that 
when it comes to public policy the fact that one policy would produce more 
happiness for all than some other policy is a reason to choose it, or I think 
the fact that some present would ease someone's sorrow is a reason to give 
it, or whatever. Suppose too, though, that I resist the utilitarian view that 
some action is right if and only if it produces the greatest happiness for 
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the greatest number, on the grounds that there are some things one cannot 
legitimately do to another person no matter how much happiness would be 
produced. In this situation I might well recognize that the utilitarian's position, 
given her other beliefs, is more coherent than mine. And I may have no single 
overarching moral principle to propose in place of the utilitarian's. Am I then 
required to accept utilitarianism? Is a coherentist committed to saying I am? 
The utilitarian and I share a good number of beliefs concerning the sort of 
considerations that might be relevant to moral evaluation, and to this extent 
we both have some grounds for thinking utilitarianism is true. Yet we differ 
on crucial points; in particular, I think (say) that willful murder is always 
wrong, no matter what, and that a sadist's pleasures are utterly worthless, and 
I think the rightness of an act depends as much on why it was performed as 
on the effects it happens to produce. She believes that I am wrong about these 
things (and others). I may, of course, be brought around to the utilitarian's view 
if she offers compelling grounds for seeing my own beliefs as explicable but 
false. And part of her argument in defense of utilitarianism will reasonably 
be that the utilitarian view does a good job of accounting for a number of 
things we both believe, which itself provides some evidence for the principle. 
Still, and even as I give due weight to the fact that the utilitarian principle 
captures well a number of considerations, I will justifiably reject it if (but only 
if) the weight of the evidence provided by what else I believe (some of which 
she denies) tells on balance against her view. 
In the end, whether one is justified in retaining one's original view in light 
of another depends on whether one's own evidence tells in favor of the other 
view or not. In the face of (even) coherent alternatives, one justifiably rejects 
the others, when one does, on the basis of what one justifiably believes.' 
Often, the weight of one's evidence will tell against views one recognizes 
would be more coherent, and one justifiably rejects them on the grounds that 
one has reason for thinking them false. Given what else one believes, the 
alternative views do not after all count as coherent alternatives for you despite 
their being recognizably coherent when held by others. This means, of course, 
that had one's initial beliefs been different, had one believed one thing rather 
than another, one would have justifiably rejected the views that one actually 
(and with justification) accepts. But this doesn't mean that the fact that one 
believes as one does is one's reason for rejecting the alternative; rather one's 
reason is that the alternative clashes with the facts (as you take them to be). 
Recognizing the crucial role played by one's actual beliefs naturally raises 
two more ,  worries about the coherence theory: that it will have objectionably 
conservative implications and that it inappropriately privileges the beliefs one 
merely happens to have. The conservativism of the view, however, goes just 
as far as, but not farther than, the conservativism that comes with allowing 
that one must base one's beliefs on the available evidence. This inevitable 
limitation requires acknowledging that throughout our epistemic endeavors 
we will be appealing to what we believe, because what evidence one has is 
limited to that provided by one's beliefs (and other relevantly similar cognitive 
states). We are never able to stand fully apart from those beliefs without then 
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losing all grounds for believing anything at all. Yet this reliance on what we 
happen to believe has no seriously conservative implications, since those be-
liefs themselves, especially in light of the new evidence experience and reflec-
tion regularly provide, won't stand as fixed points but will instead shift in 
response to the new evidence (if they are to continue to count as justified). 
When it comes to privileging actual beliefs, it is no part of this coherence 
theory that the mere fact that one believes something, considered alone, 
provides any reason whatsoever for thinking the belief true; that evidence 
must come from other things one believes, if it is to come at all. Absent such 
a background, a person will take the content of her belief to be true, but that 
is a reflection of what it is for an attitude to count as a belief. And the content 
of that belief does serve as evidence for other things she might believe, but 
in relying on that evidence, she is not taking the fact that she believes it to 
be evidence for something else, rather she is taking what she believes (say, 
that the coffee is hot, or that willful cruelty is wrong) as her evidence." 
Sometimes, though, we do have reason to take the fact that we believe 
something as reason to believe the belief true. When we do, however, it is 
always in light of other things we believe about our having the belief—say 
that we are usually right about this sort of thing, or that it was formed under 
circumstances that are conducive to the forming of accurate beliefs. Of course, 
even without these background beliefs concerning the reliability of our belief 
forming mechanisms, the belief that we believe something will be evidence 
for a number of things (though not for the truth of the belief). For instance, 
and trivially, it will be evidence for thinking that we exist. But the evidence 
it provides for that is independent of the truth of the belief we have a belief 
concerning. The beliefs we have provide all the evidence available to us at 
any given time, yet our actual beliefs, on the coherentist view, are not even 
permissively justified except in light of the other evidence available. Far from 
treating our actual beliefs as epistemically privileged (in a way that would 
have the theory collapse into foundationalism) coherentism recognizes them 
as justified at all only as they relate to the person's other beliefs. 
Still, because the coherence theory treats as evidence only what we already 
believe, it might seem to ignore a crucial impetus for change: experience. On 
the one hand, the theory may seem unable even to accommodate experiential 
input and observation. On the other hand, although it might be able to accom-
modate such input, it may seem not properly to recognize its importance. And 
surely any adequate theory must acknowledge the role and importance of 
experience and observation when it comes to the justification of belief. 
The first concern, I think, is undercut by the role cognitively spontaneous 
beliefs are able to play within coherentism. It's true, coherentism doesn't 
allow experience as relevant to justification unless and until the experience 
comes into the person's cognitive economy. Yet, especially in its recognition 
of cognitively spontaneous beliefs, coherentism leaves room for experiences 
to enter that cognitive economy unbidden, either thanks to the experiences 
themselves having a cognitive content (in which case it is the content of 
the experience that serves as evidence) or by their being the content of an 
' 
appropriate cognitive attitude (in which case it is the fact that such an experi-
ence occurred that serves as evidence). At the same time, coherentists can 
mark off the cognitively spontaneous beliefs that provide observational evi-
dence for other things we believe, by embracing an account of observation 
according to which any belief formed noninferentially as a direct result of 
perceptual experience counts as an observation. Of course, which beliefs 
we justifiably count as having been formed in direct response to perceptual 
experience will itself depend on what we believe about ourselves and our 
situation; we can only justifiably distinguish between those spontaneous beliefs 
that count as observations and those that don't in light of what else we believe. 
And even when we do justifiably mark that general distinction, we will be 
justified in treating any particular observation as accurate only in light of what 
else we believe. Nonetheless, coherentists, no less than foundationalists, are 
able to recognize these beliefs, and other noninferred beliefs, as a regular 
source of new evidence that plays a crucial role in determining what we are 
justified in believing. What is distinctive about coherentism is its claim that 
the epistemic credentials these beliefs, and all others, enjoy is dependent on 
the evidential/inferential relations they bear to others. And a belief can bear 
the appropriate sort of relation to others even if, as it happens, it was caused 
directly by experience or is concerned directly with experience. 
The second concern is encouraged by the thought that the coherence 
theory is committed to treating a set of beliefs as justified as long as it is 
coherent, regardless of whether those beliefs have been properly informed 
by experience. Even if the coherence theory can allow experiential input, the 
concern is that it treats such input as incidentally important rather than crucial. 
The worry can be brought out with an example. Imagine that someone 
holds an exceedingly coherent set of beliefs, as coherent as any coherentist 
could demand. But imagine too that because of some neural accident, or a 
Mad Scientist's mucking about, or God's intervention, her beliefs become 
insensitive to experience. Her beliefs remain in a coherent stasis, although 
now they are uninfluenced one way or the other by her accumulating experi-
ence. Surely, one is inclined to say, she is no longer justified in holding her 
beliefs despite their continued coherence, and this shows that, as the founda-
tionalist can hold, the status of our beliefs as justified depends on their being 
properly responsive to experience and not on their being coherent.68  
So far, the case is crucially underdescribecl. We need to distinguish between: 
(i) the person whose experiences continue to provide her with evidence that 
she unfortunately fails to take into account; and (ii) the person who may in 
a sense continue to have experiences although the link between her experience 
and her cognitive states is severed in a way that keeps her from acquiring 
tew evidence from_those experiences. In the first case, she is clearly unjustified 
n holding her beliefs precisely for the reasons a coherentist can acknowledge: 
he violates the basing requirement. Whatever explains her continuing to 
told the beliefs she does, it is not the evidence available to her. What she 
relieves may or may not be justified; whether it is depends on whether the 
,vidence 'provided by her experiences (to which she is unresponsive) tells 
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against them, on balance. But because she doesn't believe as she does because 
her beliefs cohere well with her evidence, she is not justified in holding those 
beliefs even on the coherentist's view. In the second case, though, the coher-
entist will say that the person may in fact be justified in holding her beliefs, 
though she is in an episternically sad situation. For in this case she is, by 
hypothesis, not receiving new evidence from her senses and so her failure to 
respond to those experiences by changing her beliefs is no reflection on the 
justification she has for them. To think otherwise is to fall back on the sort 
of externalism that holds people strictly liable for what they believe even in 
cases where they have no reason to believe otherwise.' Either way, I think 
the example doesn't support the idea that coherentism ignores the importance 
of one's being properly responsive to one's experiences. 
Nonetheless, coherentism requires experience only to the extent experi-
ence (broadly construed) is the source of new evidence. It imposes no specific 
requirement on the nature of that experience (on either its source or content) 
nor on how a person must see her views as being related to experience. And 
its liberalness on these matters may be problematic. There are two plausible 
claims that together suggest that peoples' beliefs are justified only if they see 
those beliefs as grounded in their experience. The first is that a person's beliefs 
are justified only if the supposition that they are true figures as part of the 
best explanation that person has of her holding the belief. The second is that 
such an explanation will inevitably, at some point, appeal to that person's 
experiences. The first claim gets its plausibility from the conviction that we 
would have reason to rely on our beliefs only if we thought they were respon-
sive to the facts they concern, just as we would have reason to rely on someone 
else's beliefs only if we thought their beliefs responsive to the facts they 
concern. The second gets its plausibility from the general conviction that only 
experience establishes an appropriate link between our beliefs and what they 
are about. 
The first claim goes wrong, in the way the doxastic ascent argument does, 
if it sees justification as available only to those who have beliefs about their 
beliefs (to the effect that the truth of the beliefs helps to explain their being 
held). One might justifiably hold the beliefs one does without even being 
aware of the beliefs themselves as things that might be explained. Yet for 
those of us who do have beliefs about our beliefs, it does seem reasonable 
for us to ask, and to be worried if we can't answer in the appropriate way, 
the question of why we believe as we do. If we discover our beliefs seem not 
appropriately sensitive to the facts (as we take them to be) we will normally 
see that as good grounds for suspecting that our believing as we do in effect 
violates the basing requirement.'m  So for those who recognize the basing re-
quirement and see the connection between satisfying that requirement , and 
being able to explain their beliefs by appeal to their truth, the requirement 
will make sense. Others, though, in holding different views, may still be justified 
in believing as they do. 
As for the second claim, whether being appropriately sensitive to the facts 
involves our views being sensitive to our experiences depends in large part 
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on whether our beliefs concern matters that we believe to be discoverable 
only through experience. When it comes to morals and mathematics, for 
instance, the relevance of experience is at least questionable. To the extent 
we are thorough-going empiricists, though, we will think experience is always 
crucial, and the demand that we be able to see our beliefs as hooking up in 
the right way with experience will then be natural. Yet one might intelligibly 
reject empiricism and, depending on what else one believes, be justified in 
doing so. Thus, even if empiricism is true, recognizing its truth and living up 
to the strictures such a recognition would bring, cannot plausibly be seen as 
conditions on justified belief. 
The important thing to notice about both the explanatory requirement 
and the empiricist assumption is that they represent at most substantive restric-
tions on what we can justifiably believe, given what else we believe. And 
coherentism can perfectly well acknowledge these restrictions as ones we 
justifiably believe appropriate; they are more or less justified, according to 
the coherentist, to the extent to which they are actually supported by the 
evidence available to those who hold them. All that coherentism denies is 
that satisfying them represents a necessary condition on justification. On the 
coherentist's view, even if, on balance, we have reason to reject any belief 
not properly grounded in experience, other people may, depending on what 
else they believe, be justified in holding their beliefs even when they have no 
explanation of them or no explanation of them that links them to experience. 
Incidentally, I
. do think that the truth of our moral beliefs often plays a 
role in explaining both why we hold them and why we have the experiences 
we take as evidence for them. Thus we might appeal to the injustice of certain 
institutions to explain the social unrest we observe; to the value of an activity 
to explain why it regularly gives rise to satisfaction; to the evilness of a 
character to explain a person's willingness to act as we learn someone has. 
Yet these explanations rely on our justifiably believing institutions of that 
type unjust, or activities of that sort good, or characters of that kind evil; they 
go through only if, in giving them, we can legitimately invoke other background 
moral views in accounting for the relation between morality and the experi-
ences we hope to explain. If instead we had to build up, piecemeal, and without 
recourse to background views, an explanation of moral beliefs relying initially 
only on certain privileged beliefs (say concerning our sensory experiences) 
we would, I suspect, never find ourselves having to appeal to the truth of our 
moral views to explain our holding them. At the same time, though, I suspect 
as well that were we similarly obliged to explain our nonmoral views in this 
piecemeal fashion the truth of few of them would figure in an explanation of 
our holding them. 
An important advantage of the coherence theory is that it can make good 
sense of our legitimately relying in this way on background assumptions, 
whether moral or not: If these assumptions cohere well with the other things 
we4vlieve, then when it comes time to show that our particular beliefs, say, 
some of our moral beliefs, are properly responsive to our experiences, the 
background assumptions are among the beliefs we may legitimately take into 
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account. If everything comes together appropriately, and the explanations 
actually go through, we can justifiably believe that our moral beliefs play a 
role in explaining our experiences. Of course, everything might not come 
together appropriately; even as we find ourselves initially justified in relying 
on moral assumptions in trying to explain our experiences, we may discover 
the explanations are not good. In that case, we need to weigh the justification 
we have for those beliefs against the recognition that they might be explanato-
'rily impotent. While I think the bulk of the justification we have for our 
moral beliefs really has nothing to do with their playing an important role in 
explaining our experiences, I am inclined to think that we would not be 
justified in believing of some moral principles that they were true, unless we 
also thought their being true made some difference to, and so contribute to 
an explanation of, our believing them.' 
Conclusion 
Most of this paper has been given over to articulating and defending a version 
of the coherence theory of justification. As that theory would have it, a belief 
is justified if, and then to the extent that, it coheres well with the other things 
a person believes. And a person is justified in holding some belief if and only 
if the belief itself is justified and she holds it because it is justified. In various 
crucial ways the theory differs from most versions of the coherence theory. 
First of all, rather than dodging the regress argument by embracing a holistic 
theory of justification, this version meets the argument head on and, with 
the foundationalist, acknowledges that certain beliefs may serve as suitable 
regress-stoppers. Unlike foundationalism, however, it insists that these regress-
stoppers—the beliefs that count as permissively, but not positively, justi-
fied—enjoy no special epistemic privilege and are themselves characterizable 
only in terms of the evidential connections they bear to other beliefs. When 
beliefs are permissively justified it is only in light of the relations they bear 
to other beliefs. Second of all, while it treats the coherence of one's beliefs 
as a criterion of justification, it treats coherence itself not as a justifying 
property of those beliefs but rather as a measure of the evidential support 
the beliefs enjoy. In every case, what evidence a person has for her beliefs is 
found not in their relative coherence, but in the contents of her other beliefs. 
Thus there is in coherentism a built-in commitment to relativism about 
justification. What a person in fact believes, and so what evidence she happens 
to have available, is crucial to whether her views are justified, and a belief 
one person is justified in accepting may be such that others would be justified 
in rejecting it. The relativism doesn't collapse, of course, into the view that 
anything one takes to be justified is. The coherentist says a person's belief is 
justified only if it coheres well with her other beliefs; whether it does is 
independent of whether she thinks it does (except as such a belief might be 
countenanced as evidentially related to other things she believes). In any given 
case, according to coherentism, there is a fact of the matter about whether 
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someone is justified and they, as well as anyone else, might get that fact 
wrong. 
There is as well a deep seated recognition of fallibilism. Not only does a 
coherentist treat each belief as open to revision in light of others, she recognizes 
also that even a fully coherent, and so wonderfully justified, set of beliefs 
might turn out to be false. Justification's link to truth, such as it is, is not 
provided by coherence itself, but instead by the evidential relations that bind 
beliefs together into coherent sets. Thus the theory makes good sense of how 
we can look back on our own earlier beliefs as having been justified and yet 
now justifiably thought wrong; and it makes good sense out of how we can 
distinguish among others as between those who are justified in holding their 
differing (and as we see it false) views and those that aren't. 
At the same time, the theory finds a good place for the thought that, while 
we recognize that any of our beliefs might be wrong, that fact about us 
and our beliefs doesn't in and of itself count as strong reason to reject our 
view—certainly not nearly as strong as would be our coming to think we 
actually had made a mistake (in which case we've got reasons precisely as 
strong as the support that view has, for changing the view in question). Thus 
the coherentist responds to the skeptic neither decisively nor simply by decid-
ing not to worry about her challenge, but by advancing a positive view about 
what sort of evidence the mere possibility of error constitutes. Each suggestion 
that a person might have made a mistake is appropriately countered, when 
it can be, by appeal to the evidence, available that supports the view. A person 
might of course be wrong in the positive view she advances—a possibility the 
skeptic will push—but that fact too tells only so far against the weight of the 
evidence the person might be able to marshall in defense of her own view. 
Whether, concerning any particular issue, a person is justified in accepting 
skepticism will turn (as does the justification for all beliefs) on the weight of 
the evidence available. 
In defending the coherence theory of justification I have, in effect, been 
offering an extended defense of the particularly epistemic value of the method 
of reflective equilibrium. The general line of defense is, I hope, pretty clear: 
The method is valuable because its successful deployment results in our hold-
ing justified beliefs. However, the defense remains only partial since it simply 
assumes that the mutual support sought in using the method corresponds to 
evidential support. Although I believe it does, I've offered here no argument 
for thinking so. 
In any case, let me turn to the two questions I raised early in the paper: 
Under what conditions are a person's moral beliefs epistemically justified? 
and under what conditions are our moral beliefs epistemically justified? In 
answer to the first, I've argued—by defending a version of the coherence 
theory—that a person's moral beliefs are epistemically justified if, and then 
to the extent that, they cohere well with the other things she believes. With 
this answer in mind, it should be clear that an answer to the second question 
needn't merely repeat the answer to the first, at least when we can say some-
thing substantive about the various other things we happen to believe. 
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As it happens, when we turn our attention to our moral beliefs, most of 
us find that, on the one hand, we seem to have overwhelmingly good reason 
for believing certain things (e.g., that deliberate cruelty is wrong, that slavery 
is unjust, and that courage is valuable, that happiness is important, that justice is 
appropriately demanded, and that certain considerations are morally relevant, 
others not); while, on the other hand, we have a substantial number of beliefs 
about morality as well as about metaphysics and epistemology more generally, 
that seemingly tell against our having any good reason at all for holding the 
moral beliefs we do (or any others). Some of our apparently well-supported 
beliefs, in other words, seem to clash with others. Coherentism councils against 
taking any of these views as decisive, yet at the same time it encourages 
seeking out some accommodation by sorting through the various commitments 
that clash in an attempt to render them at least consistent and preferably more. 
To the extent that our moral views can be reconciled with the other things 
we believe, they will be epistemically justified, and all the more so as they 
provide evidence for one another. Yet the pressing worries about moral theory 
are really worries as to whether our moral views will even minimally cohere 
with the bulk of things we seemingly justifiably believe. In raising metaphysical, 
epistemological, and psychological worries about the status of our moral claims 
we are articulating the considerations that seem to stand as, often quite strong, 
evidence against our moral beliefs. Depending on how strong that evidence 
is, our moral views, even if they cohere well among themselves, might turn 
out to be unjustified. This means the coherence theory provides no safe haven 
for our moral opinions; it won't count them as justified if only they can be 
made internally consistent and systematically impressive. They will be justified 
if, but only if, they cohere well with the other things we believe; that is, if, 
but only if, the weight of all the available evidence tells in their favor. How 
the evidence weighs is, unfortunately, not at all clear. What is clear, though, 
is that any account that can succeed in making good sense of our moral views 
as, by our lights, metaphysically unambitious, epistemically accessible, and 
psychologically realistic, will straight-away enjoy a huge epistemic advantage. 
Working out such an account, while essential to the epistemic good standing 
of our moral beliefs, is not so much a matter of doing epistemology as it is 
one of doing moral philosophy. Yet, if the coherence theory is right, in doing 
the moral philosophy, we have good reason to adjust our moral beliefs in 
light of metaphysical and epistemological concerns. And, to go back to the 
first point I made in this paper, we have good reason as well to recognize 
how much of morality is not a matter of belief at all; for that too is part of 
the evidence we must accommodate.' 
Notes 
1. Presumably, whatever capacities, abilities, and skills, constitute knowing how 
to be moral would, in principle, find a propositional reflection in a full compendium 
of moral truths (among which would be included the claim that acting morally requires 
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having certain capacities, etc.). Yet possession of such a compendium, even if fully 
grasped and completely justified, may leave one utterly unable, even if willing, to do 
what one knows is required. And in not knowing how to do what one knows to be 
required, one would be lacking a pivotal bit of moral knowledge. 
2. Later on I will say something about how epistemic justification differs from 
other sorts of justification. For the time being, however, I will simply assume we all 
have an intuitive grasp on there being a difference between, say, the moral, the 
pragmatic, and the epistemic credentials a belief might enjoy. Each set of credentials 
may, in a perfectly reasonable sense, make it true that the belief is justified, but the 
sort of justification at issue will change as the relevant credentials shift. My concern, 
 
will be with epistemic credentials—those that get their point and purchase from a 
concern with evidence, truth, and knowledge. 
3. J. L. Mackie defends this view in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmond-
sworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1977). 
4. For influential defences of what is often called noncognitivism, see A. J. Ayer's 
Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 1952); C. L. Stevenson's Ethics and 
Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944); Simon Blackburn's Essays in 
Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Allan Gibbard's Wise 
Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 
5. So, for instance, to the extent that an action is successfully justified by appeal 
to its consequences, then the fact that the action has those consequences is grounds 
for believing that the action is right or permissible; and to the extent some attitude is 
successfully justified by appeal to its cause, then the fact that the attitude was caused 
in the way it was is grounds for believing the attitude appropriate. 
6. What I am concerned with here is the justification of belief in general and if 
moral beliefs don't require justification (because there aren't any) then we can ask 
equally well what would justify one in thinking there are no moral beliefs. 
7. I note here only a natural inclination. One might accept the coherence theory 
of justification and nonetheless reject the coherence methodology. Aiming directly at 
some goal is not always the best way of achieving it and it may be that aiming 
directly at securing a coherent set of beliefs (in the way the coherence methodology 
recommends) might not be the best way of securing such a set. 
8. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). Earlier, Nelson Goodman of-
fered a defense of the method's use in determining valid rules of deductive and inductive 
inference in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, 4th edition (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), pp. 63-66, originally published in 1955. See Norman Daniels' "Wide 
Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics," Journal of Philosophy 
(1979), pp. 256-82; and "Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points," Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy (1980), pp. 83-103; for lucid discussion of the method of reflective 
equilibrium. See also Michael DePaul's Balance and Refinement (London: Routledge, 
1993) and my "Coherence and Models for Model Theorizing," Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly (1985), pp. 170-90. 
9. This is an empirical claim, of course. In principle, at least, someone might 
actually settle on an equilibrium that would remain unshaken by further reflection. A 
huge number of people do actually refuse to change their views in light of further 
reflection. But I suspect most of these people of dogmatism rather than reflective 
success. 
10. See, for instance, David Lyons' "Nature and Soundness of Contract and Coher-
ence Arguments," in Reading Rawls, ed. by Norman Daniels (New York: Basic Books, 
1975), pp. 141-67; and Richard Brandt's A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 18-20. 
11. To take one example, Sidgwick seems to have accepted a foundationalist theory 
of justification in ethics and elsewhere, even as he thought of, what was in effect, the 
method of reflective equilibrium as a useful means of discovering the fundamental 
principles of morality. These principles are justifiably believed, he thought, not in 
virtue of their cohering with other things we believe but rather because they are 
certified by intuition properly deployed. The Methods of Ethics, by Henry Sidgwick 
(London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1907), seventh edition. 
12. As skeptical as one might be of moral beliefs and the suggestion that some of 
them might be justified, that skepticism needn't have its source in a rabid skepticism 
that dismisses the very idea of justified belief. I will assume that the notion of justified 
belief makes sense, even if no beliefs (moral or otherwise) actually are justified, While 
this means I will be begging the question against a few skeptical positions, all but the 
most rabid skepticisms work with some account or other of justified belief to make 
good their own skeptical position. Most versions of skepticism, though, are advanced 
as being themselves justified (which means they are committed to at least some beliefs 
being justified). So it is worth noting that the only skepticisms I will be leaving com-
pletely to one side are those that reject out of hand and without offering a justification 
the very idea of justified belief. (Truth be told, I don't much mind ignoring them.) 
13. A person, it seems, might be morally but neither pragmatically nor epistemically 
justified in holding some belief, or pragmatically but neither morally nor epistemically 
justified, or epistemically but neither morally nor pragmatically justified. The various 
different considerations that are relevant to these different evaluations might be such 
that, in some circumstances, they conflict in their deliverances. Perhaps they might, 
with suitable specification and elaboration, be shown in fact to coincide. Just such a 
(partial) coincidence is sought, for instance, by those who offer a pragmatic justification 
for acting morally.. If indeed acting morally were always in our interest, then those 
actions (including acts of believing) that count as morally justified would be at the 
same time pragmatically justified (assuming that we are pragmatically justified in doing 
what is in our interest). Alternatively, such a (partial) coincidence is sought by those 
who offer a moral defense of believing as one's evidence would allow as well as by 
those who offer an epistemic defense of believing as morality requires. 
14. However, I should note that sometimes our epistemic evaluation of someone's 
holding of a belief has more to do with whether she has taken due care in collecting 
evidence and reflected adequately on it, than with whether the evidence she has justifies 
the belief. Whether these considerations are invoked in determining justification or 
are instead involved in a distinct notion of epistemic responsibility, is often unclear. 
To the extent epistemic justification is at issue, though, I suspect that which standards 
are appropriate for evaluating due care and adequate reflection will depend on the 
evidence available to the person being evaluated. If so, then whether or not one is 
epistemically justified in seeking no further evidence or in limiting reflection depends 
on whether, for instance, one has grounds for thinking that there is important evidence 
still to be found or properly appreciated. Yet even if one has no such grounds, and 
so is not unjustified in holding the belief, one might nonetheless be holding it irresponsi-
bly—if one has a responsibility to seek more evidence or reflect further even in cases 
where one has no reason to think one has such a responsibility. 
15, Even necessary truths are such that a person might come to believe one (say 
as a result of wishful thinking or testimony one knew better than to trust) in a way 
that leaves the person unjustified in accepting it. 
16. I simply pass over, in this paper, the difficulties facing any attempt to specify 
exactly what it would be for a person's beliefs to be based in the appropriate way on 
her evidence. I pass over as well the complications that are induced by a person's 
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beliefs always being only more or less based on her evidence; a number of other factors 
are inevitably required in order for one to form or maintain a belief at all. To what 
extent one's belief needs to be based on one's evidence in order to satisfy the basing 
requirement is, at best, difficult to say. 
17. See the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Harper & Row, 
1964), trans. by H. J. Paton, p. 65. 
18. How far the parallel can be pushed, I'm not sure. I certainly don't want to 
defend the Epistemic Imperative as a synthetic a priori truth (but then I wouldn't 
want to defend the Categorical Imperative as one either). Regardless, in both cases 
there's some plausibility in thinking the two imperatives cash out appealing conceptions 
of justification. Hume advocates something like the epistemic imperative, when he 
observes that "A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence." See 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. 
H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 110. 
19. ibid., p. 88. 
20. She might even be both morally and pragmatically justified in holding such 
beliefs if, for instance, she is within her rights to believe as she does and her so believing 
is to her advantage (as it may well be if she is surrounded by others who share 
her convictions). 
21. Suppose some people are epistemically justified in holding an immoral view, 
are they then morally culpable for the evil they do on the basis of those beliefs? The 
answer to this turns crucially on whether (and if so, how) the standards of moral 
responsibility are sensitive to peoples' epistemological situation. If the boundaries of 
moral responsibility are set in part by what one could justifiably believe, then it might.  
well be that a person who acts immorally on the basis of epistemically well-justified, 
but morally objectionable, views is not responsible for what she does. Ignorance is, in 
the absence of negligence, a reasonable moral excuse. And whether one has been 
negligent depends (I am inclined to think) on whether one had reason to think acting 
differently was important. 
22. Someone might resist the "only if" in this formulation arguing that a liberal 
minded foundationalist could say just that one way (among others) for a belief to be 
justified is for it to be either foundational or inferentially supported by foundational 
beliefs. I opt for the stronger formulation of foundationalism because the main argu-
ment for foundationalism--the regress argument (which I discuss later in the pa-
per)—turns on the "only if" clause when it assumes that no beliefs would be justified 
in the absence of some noninferentially justified beliefs. Other arguments might be 
appealed to, though, and they might require only the weaker formulation of foundation-
alism: In fact, the chapters by Audi and Sinnott-Armstrong in this collection work with 
he weaker definition of foundationalism. Even these weaker foundationalisms, though, 
accept the view, rejected by coherentism, that some beliefs are epistemically privileged 
independently of the inferential/evidential relations they hear to other beliefs. 
23. See William Alston's "Two Types of Foundationalism," in the Journal of 
Philosophy 73 (1976), pp. 165-85, 
24. Two metaphors have dominated characterizations of the two theories: the 
metaphor of a pyramid to capture foundationalism and that of a raft at sea to capture 
coherentism. But both are grossly misleading. The pyramid metaphor is misleading 
since the arguments for foundationalism alone do not support any particular view of 
how the structure of justified belief will be shaped (other than by requiring some sort 
of hierarchy). The raft metaphor is less misleading, I suppose, because it does capture 
nicely the idea that, on a coherentist's view (but also on the foundationalist's view) 
-•••• 	 " - 	 - • -- 
things are going better to the extent the raft holds together and better still as the 
various pieces initially merely lashed together become well secured. But usually the 
point of the raft analogy is that coherentism allows that, at any particular time, any 
piece of the raft is liable to replacement. A foundationalist, too, though, might consis-
tently grant that every belief is in principle liable to replacement—foundationalism 
doesn't require infallibilism—even as it is committed to saying that there must be on 
board at least some beliefs of a certain privileged kind. See Ernest Sosa's "The Raft 
and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge," in 
Midwest Studies, vol 5. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), pp. 3-25. 
25. See David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), p. 469. 
26. Most self-described intuitionists fall into this group. See H. A. Prichard's Moral 
Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949); G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903); and W. D. Ross' The Right and the 
Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930). Sidgwick, however, falls squarely in 
the next group. See The Methods of Ethics, op. cit. More recently, the analogy with 
perception has been stressed by, for instance, John McDowell in "Value and Secondary 
Qualities," Morality and Objectivity, ed. by Ted Honderich (London: Routledge and 
Kogan Paul, 1985), pp. 110-29; Mark Maus in "Moral Reality," in Ways of Meaning 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 243-63; Jonathan Dancy in Moral 
Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); and David McNaughton in Moral Vision (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1988). Despite their reliance on the perceptual model, however, each of 
these more recent works adopts epistemological views that lean towards coherentism. 
27. Compatible with this crucial difference, coherentism may have a great deal in 
common with foundationalism. It might, for instance, recognize different classes of 
belief (even as it rejects the suggestion that any class is epistemically privileged), or 
embrace the same inferential principles, or even allow that justified beliefs take on, 
for instance, a pyramid structure. 
28. Although foundationalism and coherentism, as I have characterized them, are 
mutually exclusive, they clearly don't exhaust the possibilities. Someone might well 
reject foundationalism's commitment to an epistemically privileged class of beliefs and 
yet resist coherentism's positive account of justification in terms of coherence. One 
might hold, for instance, that one's beliefs are justified if they are reliable indicators 
of the facts they concern, or, alternatively, if they are the product of a reliable belief-
forming mechanism. In neither case would their justification turn on their cohering 
with one's other beliefs, except to the extent the relevant sort of reliability is related 
to coherence. 
29. Here again the familiar suggestions emerge: An inferential relation might count 
as appropriate only if it is deductive, or inductive, or explanatory. 
30. And of course that one belief rather than another might be prompted directly 
by an experience will almost surely be a reflection of what else one believes and will 
in any case be available in the first place only thanks to one having the conceptual 
repertoire one does. 
31. Clearly, when it comes to working out the details of the basing requirement, 
coherentists need to make sense of how it is that a justified, though uninferred, belief 
might still be such as to be held because it is justified. And this might look to be 
especially tricky for a coherentist since the belief's status as justified is supposed to 
depend on its inferential relations to other beliefs. Here, though, what the coherentist 
maintains is that such a belief appropriately depends on its being justified as long as 
it would not have been held had it not borne the right relations. (In whichever way 
II 
184 	 Moral Knowledge? Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory 	 185 
this gets worked out, it will have to take account of the complications mentioned and 
sidestepped in note #16.) 
32. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 72a25-73a20. 
33. A powerful skeptical position in ethics, for instance, embraces foundationalism 
as an account of justification, mobilizes the "is"/"ought" distinction to show that if 
our moral views have a foundation that foundation must be provided by some of our 
moral beliefs, and then maintains that none of our moral beliefs will do the job. 
34. The collection of arguments I run through find their source in Wilfrid Sellars' 
"Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," although there the discussion is in terms 
of knowledge, not justification, and it unfolds without making explicit appeal to the 
basing requirement. See Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 127-96, esp. sec. 36, Laurence BonJour, in The Structure of 
Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); and David Brink, 
in Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), both offer clear expressions of this argument. 
35. In these two examples I am just picking up on one sort of reason one might 
have for thinking one's belief justified. Alternative suggestions come with different 
accounts of what would need to be true of a belief for it to serve appropriately as 
grounds for believing anything else. The variety of suggestions here is as plentiful as 
the variety of accounts foundationalists have offered for treating one class of beliefs 
or another as epistemically privileged. 
36. . A great deal might be packed into what is required in order for a person's 
beliefs to be appropriately sensitive to her evidence. It might be, for example, that 
she must be able to offer reasons for her view, or be able and willing to change her 
view in light of new evidence, or be able to re-evaluate the value of old evidence in 
light of new. I don't know whether any of these additional requirements are actually 
appropriate. What I am suggesting, though, is that self-consciousness of oneself as a 
believer is not required, whatever else is, 
37. They might hold, for instance, that when beliefs are based on certain noncogni-
tive states—e.g., perceptual or introspectable states—those states justify the beliefs. 
See Anthony Quinton's The Nature of Things (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1973); and John Pollock's Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Totowa, NJ: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1986). 
38. But only a version since, as will become clear, the sort of coherentism I defend 
counts as an externalist theory of justification even though it embraces an internalist 
account of reasons. 
39. In what follows I will use "belief" loosely enough to cover a whole slew of 
cognitive states that have propositional content, The distinctions I thus cover over 
may well be important, of course, in other contexts where one might contrast belief 
with, for instance, experience on the grounds that belief is active and reflectively-
sensitive, whereas experience is passive and receptive. If the distinction were to he 
drawn in that way, I am committed to saying that the contents of experience and of 
belief are of a piece (and both are conceptual) at least to the extent the experiences 
are supposed to provide reasons for believing. See John McDowell's Mind and World 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 
40. By embracing this sort of internalism, I am taking a stand on a controversial 
issue and merely rehearsing fairly familiar arguments. A satisfying discussion of the 
issues would take more space than I can give it here. Still, in the end, I believe the 
familiar arguments, do carry the day. For an in-depth attack on internalism, though, 
see Frederick Schmitt's Knowledge and Belief (London: Routledge, 1992). 
41. This will be true when a person has no reason not to hold it or when, if she 
has such a reason, it is at least balanced by some reason she has for holding it. 
42. Clearly there are two other possible readings: (i) one belief provides (permis-
sive) justification for another only if it is, itself, (permissively) justified; and (ii) one 
belief provides (permissive) justification for another only if it is, itself, (positively) 
justified. The first of these is weaker even than the weak reading defended in what 
follows, and would in any case be irrelevant to establishing that we ever have positive 
reason to believe as we do; and the second would, like the strong reading rejected in 
what follows, make an appeal to permissive justification useless when it comes to 
stopping the regress. 
43. A foundationalist might conceivably maintain that the epistemically privileged 
beliefs can provide positive support for themselves. This may be the hopeful idea 
behind holding that a belief might be self-evident. But then a foundationalist needs 
to make sense of the idea that a belief (that is, the content of a belief) can provide 
evidence for that very belief. And she needs to do this in a way that doesn't entail 
that all beliefs provide this kind of support for themselves. (So she can't simply say, 
for example, that what justifies her belief that she seems to see blue is that she seems 
to see blue, which at first might sound plausible, since every belief that p could then 
be justified by p, for any p.) The most likely candidates for status as self-evident are 
presumably beliefs that have analytic truths as their content, yet even they seem only 
sometimes justifiably believed. Whether a person is positively justified in holding such 
beliefs seems to depend, on why she is holding them, on whether, for instance, she 
recognizes them to be analytic or accepts them on good authority or has some other 
reason to think they are true. 
44. Although permissively justified beliefs can serve to stop the regress, presumably 
only positively justified beliefs enjoy the sort of support that knowledge is usually 
thought to presuppose. In any' case, a belief that is merely permissively justified will 
be a belief one has, on balance, no reason to believe—it enjoys no positive justification. 
45. Whether these cases are ultimately intelligible is open to question. It's arguable 
(but I think not true) that the beliefs we are able to attribute to two people so differently 
situated must always be different. If so, then the supposition that they share beliefs 
can't be sustained. What matters, though, is not so much whether these represent real' 
possibilities; what matters is that, were they possible, we would normally count the people 
involved as being equally justified, though not equally well-situated epistemically. 
46. G. E. Moore articulates this idea as he spells out what it would be for something 
to exhibit organic unity. See Principia Ethica, 
47. Given the definition of positive justification and the rejection of externalism 
about a person's reasons for believing, no belief will count as positively justified when 
considered in isolation. Interestingly, though, someone inclined to accept foundation-
alism, who will then treat some beliefs as positively justified even when considered in 
isolation from other beliefs, can, and I think should, grant that beliefs to the effect 
that there are the proper relations among one's beliefs actually enhances the privileged 
beliefs' justificatory status. 
48. If this suggestion is to be worked out in a way that is compatible with the version 
of internalism I've defended, the justification enhancing role of evidential relations cannot 
be that of giving a person more reason to believe as she does (since the presence of the 
relation may be something about which she has no beliefs even when it holds). 
49. See Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ibid., pp, 61-62. 
50. Incidentally, even if the relations themselves are seen as being valuable, the 
value they have might itself be conditional on their relating real evidence. Thus, while 
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the relations will presumably be characterized in terms that allow them to stand among 
propositions (whether believed or not), the evidential value of these relations might 
depend upon the status of those propositions as evidence—which status they will have, 
I've argued, only as they become the content of the relevant person's beliefs. 
51. Although misleading in some ways, the Bayesian principle of conditionaliza-
lion, and the phenomenon of the "swamping of priors," may nonetheless provide a 
suggestive model for the link between evidential relations and truth that I have in 
mind. Loosely characterized, here's the phenomenon: given certain assumptions con-
cerning the structure and availability of probability estimates, it can be shown that 
people who start with even wildly different beliefs (priors) concerning, for instance, 
the fairness of some coin (each thinking it biased, but in opposite ways) will, given 
enough information about the results of repeated coin tosses, come to the same view 
concerning the probability that it will come up heads on the next toss, as long as they 
revise their beliefs according to the principle of conditionalization; and this will be 
true (almost) no matter what probabilities they originally assigned. Moreover, the view 
they will then share will be an accurate view, if the information they receive about 
successive coin tosses is accurate and bountiful enough. 
52. Just as foundationalism admits of both skeptical and anti-skeptical strands, so 
too does coherentism: a skeptical coherentist holds, in effect, that there are no evidential 
relations that might hold among our beliefs. Thus, on this view, coherentism gives the 
right account of what it would take for our beliefs to be positively justified, but none 
of them have what it takes—an evidential relation to our other beliefs. 
53. Lewis Carroll uses his own regress argument to establish this in "What The 
Tortoise Said to Achilles," Mind 4 (1895), pp. 278-80. 
54. flow well, and whether, a belief coheres with the others a person holds will 
depend, in part, on what alternatives are available to her. Before Newton came on 
the scene, people were justified in believing things about the workings of the world 
that later they would have been unjustified in accepting in light of the evidence and 
options available. So we might say, a bit more precisely, that a belief is justified only 
if, and then to the extent that, it coheres better than does any competitor belief with 
the other things the person believes (where two beliefs will compete with one another 
if either might, but both can't, be held by the person in question). 
55. Although here I will be characterizing the coherence of a set of beliefs, the 
same considerations of evidential consistency, connectedness, and comprehensiveness, 
will serve to characterize the relative coherence of sets of propositions directly. So, 
for instance, a set of propositions that constitute a theory will count as minimally 
coherent if appropriately consistent, and then as more than minimally coherent as the 
theory is connected and comprehensive. 
56. The evidential consistency requirement insists on both more and less than 
would a requirement that demanded logical consistency from the contents of the beliefs 
in the set. It demands more because a set that contained only logically consistent 
beliefs would nonetheless fall short of evidential consistency if the evidence provided 
by some of the beliefs, on balance, told against one of the beliefs. It demands less 
because a set that contained logically inconsistent beliefs that were equally well sup-
ported by the evidence provided by the other beliefs would count as evidentially 
consistent (and so minimally coherent). For arguments against requiring logical consis-
tency, see Richard Foley's "Justified Inconsistent Beliefs," in American Philosophical Quarterly (1979), pp. 247-57. 
57. I don't suppose that there is any algorithm for determining the relative contribu-
tions connectedness and comprehensiveness make to the over-all coherence of a set. 
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It would be a mistake, though, to think that connectedness and comprehensiveness 
will never compete. While any belief that increases the connectedness of an evidentially 
consistent set will likewise increase comprehensiveness, and any belief that increases 
comprehensiveness in such a set will at worst make no difference to connectedness, 
when it comes to comparing one coherent set with another, we may be faced with one 
that's more connected but less comprehensive than another and sometimes, at least, 
comprehensiveness may win out over connectedness or vice versa. 
58. There's no worry about a tie here since if two subsets are evidentially consistent 
and equally coherent, the set that includes all the beliefs in each that can be combined 
without losing evidential consistency will be more coherent than either. Of course, the 
larger set may contain logically inconsistent beliefs that enjoy evidential support to 
the same degree, so that the total weight of the evidence provided by beliefs in the 
set does not, on balance, tell against either. In that case, the inconsistent beliefs will 
be justified but Only permissively so. When we recognize the inconsistency, the fact 
that the beliefs are inconsistent will certainly provide evidence against accepting both 
and may constitute grounds for agnosticism. Yet recognizing the inconsistency provides 
evidence against both equally, and thus leaves the balance unchanged. We will then 
have positive—in fact conclusive—reason for thinking the inconsistent beliefs are not 
all true, which means justifiably holding them will he possible only if we can believe 
each separately without believing their conjunction. This isn't quite the same as saying, 
though, that we ought to give up one or the other of the beliefs—we might have no 
positive,  reason for giving up any one of them, although we have positive reason for 
looking for some reason. 
59. The same case will build, of course, even without the unjustified beliefs as long 
as corresponding justified beliefs to the effect that anomalies had emerged are taken 
on board as the unjustified beliefs are rejected. When the case these beliefs provide 
has become formidable, it will be because the best explanation of all the apparent 
illusions, seeming distortions, and ostensibly inaccurate observations is that they are 
nothing of the sort and that the old theory is false. 
60. Nice complications emerge when we consider situations in which the person 
herself is considering various things she might believe, each of which would cohere 
well with the other things she believes. In that case, which belief would be justified 
will depend on which of the options would cohere better with the other things she 
believes (including her beliefs concerning which of the options is more justified), and, 
having considered the options, believing one that coheres less well, but still well, with 
her beliefs, would presumably be unjustified. 
61. Whether a person's evidence will tell against some of her current beliefs, when 
it provides stronger support for some other potential beliefs, will depend on whether 
the person is aware of those options that would cohere well with what else she believes. 
62. Suppose that a person holds some belief that does cohere well with her other 
beliefs. Yet suppose also that she believes something stupid (and unjustified) from 
which she self-consciously inferred the belief? Is she justified in believing it? That 
depends: Would she have held the belief even if it hadn't cohered well with the other 
things she believes? If so, then the fact that the belief was justified doesn't explain 
her holding it and her holding it is not justified. It not, then the fact that the belief 
was justified does explain her holding it and her holding it is justified. What then 
should we say in face of the explicit and yet unjustified and non-justifying reason she 
offers for her belief? I think we should say that she was justified in holding it given 
her evidence though mistaken about why. What if she falsely believes of the belief 
that it doesn't cohere with the other things she believes? Well, if she also believes the 
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coherence theory, then her belief that the belief doesn't cohere with her other beliefs 
will be, for her, a reason to reject it—yet it is just one reason among many and that 
reason may still be overridden by the other reasons she has in virtue of which it counts 
as actually cohering better than alternatives. 
63. Although there are some complications here: Merely taking the original set 
and negating the content of all the beliefs may give one an equally consistent set of 
propositions, but that procedure will often leave one with a much less coherent set of 
potential beliefs because the negation of an explanatory principle does not always 
explain the negation of the set of claims that was originally explained. Still I think it 
reasonable to allow that suitable competitor sets can always be constructed, even if 
not by any simple procedure. 
64. In "Coherence and Models for Moral Theorizing," op. cit., I raise this objection 
to the all too common practice, in moral theory, of treating the fact that one theory 
is more coherent than another as an independent reason to think the theory true. 
65. A person may, of course, be wrong in the probabilities she associates with 
various outcomes, or the value she attributes to those outcomes. Expected utility often 
differs from actual utility. Yet, according to this theory, so far as the rationality of her 
choice is concerned, it is rational if given those views the choice she makes maximizes 
expected utility. 
66. Here the analogy with decision theory may be helpful again. We might well 
recognize another person as making a choice, from among the same options we face, 
that maximizes her expected utility, and (if only we could make good sense of interper-
sonal utility comparisons) we might recognize too that given her expectations and 
values, the option she takes has a greater expected utility for her than our best option 
has for us. Nonetheless, that provides us with no reason whatsoever to embrace the 
option she rationally chooses, We might of course take the fact that she has the 
expectations or values she does as evidence that ours are misguided, and if so, we will 
have reason to change ours, but often enough we have good reason to think what she 
expects or values is irrelevant. 
67. Just as the theory of rational choice is not committed to saying that the fact 
that something advances one's own interests need be a reason a person has for acting, 
since people's preferences may all be other-directed, so too the coherence theory is 
not committed to saying that the fact that one believes something need be a reason 
a person has for believing, since people's beliefs may all have as their content things 
other than their own beliefs. Now in fact we can expect people to be interested in 
their own interests and to have beliefs concerning their beliefs, but these interests and 
beliefs constitute only a fraction of the interests and beliefs a person usually has and 
neither the maximizing theory of rationality nor the coherence theory of justification 
gives them any special weight or importance. 
68. See Alvin Plantinga's Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
69. We may need yet a third case: It may be that the person has actually had her 
beliefs "frozen" so that she is not simply insensitive to the beliefs she forms on the 
basis of experience, nor simply cognitively cut of from her experiences. In this case, 
I think the most reasonable thing to say is that she is no longer believing anything. 
But if we still count her as believing, she will still fail the basing requirement because, 
once her beliefs are "frozen," what explains her holding of them is no longer her 
evidence but the fact that they are now unchangeable. 
70. Of course, even in our own case, we often find ourselves with beliefs we take 
to be justified despite our inability to offer any respectable explanation of why we 
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hold them, but lacking such an explanation is conspicuously different from having 
positive reason for thinking the beliefs are insensitive to the relevant facts. 
71. For discussion of these issues, see Gilbert Harman's 
The Nature of Morality 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); and Nicholas Sturgeon's "Moral Explana-
tions," in Morality, Reason and Truth (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985), 
ed. by David Copp and David Zimmerman, pp. 49-78; as well as my "Moral Theory and 
Explanatory Impotence," Midwest Studies XII, ed. by Peter French et al. (University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 433-57, and "Normative Explanations," Philosophical 
Perspectives VII, ed. by Fames Tomberlin (1992), pp. 55-72. 
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